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INAPPROPRIATE PARENTAL INFLUENCE: A NEW
APP FOR TORT LAW AND UPGRADED RELIEF
FOR ALIENATED PARENTS
Sandi S. Varnado*
INTRODUCTION
A. A Hypothetical'
Abe and Betty married in 1996. Abe was still in college while Betty
was a successful pharmaceutical representative, bringing home a very
good salary on which the young couple lived. Not long into the mar-
riage, Abe and Betty had two children, Cara (born in 1998) and David
(born in 2000). Abe began to schedule classes at night so that he
could be a stay-at-home dad to his little ones. Betty continued her
role as the primary breadwinner for the family but had a close rela-
tionship with the children.
As their marriage continued, Abe and Betty began to feel the pres-
sures of life and parenting. The two began to disagree and argue with
increasing frequency. Finally, in April 2010, Betty moved out and
filed for divorce. Abe was devastated by her decision and begged
Betty to give their marriage another shot. Betty refused. Little did
Abe know that Betty was in love with a co-worker with whom she had
begun an extramarital affair.
In Betty's divorce petition, she requested that she and Abe be
awarded joint custody of the children. However, she also asked that
the court name her as the children's domiciliary parent and allow Abe
liberal visitation. Abe balked at Betty's second request and re-
sponded with a request that the court name him domiciliary parent.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. Many thanks
to Loyola University New Orleans College of Law for the research grant to support the writing
of this Article. I would also like to thank several people who read and commented construc-
tively on drafts of this Article: William R. Corbett, Monica Hof Wallace, Alain A. Levasseur,
Aaron Hurd, and several of the Loyola Junior Faculty Forum members (Johanna Kalb, John
Blevins, Lloyd "Trey" Drury III, Andrea Armstrong, Brian Barnes, Imre Szalai, Jessica Kiser, Jo
Anne Sweeny, Rodney Miller, Chunlin Leonhard, and Kellen Zale). Additionally, I would like
to thank Hillary Barnett for her excellent research assistance and Shaneil Streva for her careful
proofreading.
1. This hypothetical is fictional. However, its facts have been collected from various cases and
news stories.
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The court granted the couple's divorce and, after a hearing on the
issue of custody, named Abe the children's domiciliary parent.
On January 1, 2011, Abe and the children moved into a nearby
apartment complex. Not long thereafter, Abe got wind of Betty's new
relationship and found out that it had begun while he and Betty were
still married. Although Abe had been committed to fostering the chil-
dren's relationship with Betty, he began to make comments about
Betty in front of the children, calling her "selfish." Soon after, he told
the children about Betty's "new boyfriend," although Betty had not
yet introduced her new boyfriend to her children. Before long, Abe
began to make disparaging comments about Betty on a daily basis.
The children began to resist visiting their mother. Betty, who always
had a close and loving relationship with the children, was horrified at
this turn of events and began to drink to cope with the pain.
Abe was happy that the children could see their mother for what
she was, and he continued to criticize her lifestyle choices, telling the
children that their mother enjoyed partying during her spare time. He
also told the children that he could not afford to purchase certain
things for them because their mother did not pay enough child sup-
port, instead using her money to buy things for her new boyfriend and
to support her drinking habit.
Upon their return from visits with Betty, Abe began to question the
children about Betty's parenting. For example, when the children
were ill at Betty's, Abe questioned them on whether Betty had both-
ered to take their temperature or give them any medicine. On the eve
of each visit with Betty, Abe began to require the children to pray for
their safety "while we are at Mom's."
One day, when Betty arrived to pick up the children, Abe refused
to answer the door, yelling through the mail slot that the children
wanted nothing to do with her. Abe changed his telephone number
and terminated all contact and communication between Betty and
their children, blocking her emails and forbidding the children from
emailing or otherwise contacting her. He told officials at the chil-
dren's school not to send any paperwork or information about the
children to Betty. He did allow Betty to see the children from time to
time, but the children were uncooperative and sullen. Betty com-
pletely changed her parenting style, choosing to passively defer to the
children's wishes so as to not anger them. Meanwhile, Abe continued
to tell the children false, spiteful things about Betty, and Betty began
to see a psychiatrist to deal with her emotional distress.
Betty filed for relief in family court, specifically asking for a change
of custody, but the court denied the request, noting that the children
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seemed happy and were succeeding both academically and in their
extracurricular activities. The judge noted that although Abe was
alienating the children from Betty, the best interest of the children
dictated that they remain in Abe's care. Betty was horrified and filed
a civil suit detailing all of Abe's alienating conduct. Abe responded
with a motion to dismiss, which the court granted, ruling that the juris-
diction did not recognize claims for alienation of affections (of chil-
dren or otherwise) and that Abe's conduct, as described by Betty, was
not extreme or outrageous. Abe's conduct therefore did not meet the
criteria for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. Overview of Parental Alienation
It is almost universally recognized that a child benefits from a close
relationship with both of his2 parents.3 However, when parents di-
vorce or physically separate, they publicly declare that they are unwill-
2. The author realizes that parental alienation has generated a battle between the sexes. See,
e.g., Kirk Makin, Parental Alienation Cases Draining Court Resources, GLOBE & MAIL, May 13,
2009, at A8 ("[T]he term 'parental alienation' and the debate itself have been hijacked by two
hopelessly polarized groups, fathers' rights activists and feminists, who each produce a simplistic
narrative."). On the one hand, some men's rights activist groups claim that mothers, motivated
by revenge, alienate the child from the father by falsely alleging abuse on the part of the father.
Barbara Jo Fidler & Nicholas Bala, Children Resisting Postseparation Contact with a Parent:
Concepts, Controversies, and Conundrums, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 10, 10 (2010). On the other hand,
some feminists claim that parental alienation does not even exist. Id. Others believe that "Pa-
rental Alienation is a power dynamic, not a gender-based dynamic." 200,000 Children Suffer
from Parental Alienation, PARENTAL RTs. (Aug. 13, 2010, 1:57 AM), http://mkg4583.word
press.com/2010/08/13/200000-children-suffer-from-parental-alienation-the-american-psychiatric-
association-considers-parental-alienation-disorder-for-the-dsm-%E2%80%93-5 (quoting Brian
Ludmer, a family law lawyer from Toronto, Canada). These commentators also assert that alien-
ation strategies are universal ones, employed by either sex. Amy J. L. Baker & Douglas Darnall,
Behaviors and Strategies Employed in Parental Alienation: A Survey of Parental Experiences, 45
J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 97, 121 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Coursey v. Superior Court of Sutter Cnty., 239 Cal. Rptr. 365, 368 (Ct. App. 1987);
Chaim Steinberger, Father? What Father? Parental Alienation and Its Effect on Children (pt. 2),
N.Y. ST. B.A. FAM. L. REV., Fall 2006, at 9, 13 ("[T]he best interests of [each] child [is] furthered
by being nurtured and guided by both of [its] natural parents." (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Young v. Young, 628 N.Y.S.2d 957, 963 (App. Div. 1995)); Michael R. Walsh
& J. Michael Bone, Parental Alienation Syndrome: An Age-Old Custody Problem, FLA. B.J.,
June 1997, at 93, 95 ("Of all of the research on the effects of separation and divorce, the one
conclusion that is never debated is that children fare better when they maintain a close relation-
ship with both parents.").
The exception lies "in the case of physical, sexual, or clear emotional abuse." Walsh & Bone,
supra, at 95; see also Ira Turkat, Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Review of Critical Issues, 18 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 131, 132 (2002) ("[A] parent deserving alienation would be one
with a repeated history of physically abusing his or her children in an unpredictable manner that
has failed to respond appropriately to numerous professional attempts to control the destructive
behaviors.").
2011] 115
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
ing or unable to get along with each other.4 Nevertheless, they share a
child who hopefully wants, and certainly needs, both parents. To re-
spect and foster those wants and needs in the wake of the family rup-
ture and to satisfy the public interest in rearing well-adjusted children
of divorce, parents must "attempt to cooperate on a regular basis
(sometimes for many years) after their joint life is terminated,"5 and
each should encourage the children's relationships with the other par-
ent. Unfortunately, not all parents do.
Approximately ten percent of divorcing parents actually litigate for
custody of their shared child,6 but even in the absence of a custody
battle,7 some divorcing parents engage in an intraparent competition
in which the prize to be won is their child." Divorce can bring out the
worst in adults. 9 After all, the adversarial nature of divorce, like any
litigation, clearly delineates a winner and a loser; it does not en-
courage cooperation during or after the lawsuit.10 This competition
sometimes leads to guerilla warfare between the parents, where one
or both parents attempt to destroy the parent-child relationship be-
4. See Kathleen Niggemyer, Comment, Parental Alienation Is Open Heart Surgery: It Needs
More than a Band-Aid to Fix It, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 567, 568 (1998).
5. Id.
6. Andrew Schepard & Stephen W. Schlissel, Planning for P.E.A.C.E.: The Development of
Court-Connected Education Programs for Divorcing and Separating Families, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 845, 859 n.33 (1995). These cases have been referred to as "some of the bloodiest battle-
fields in the gender wars." Cathy Young, Parent Trap, BOISE WKLY. (Jan. 3, 2007), http://
www.boiseweekly.com/boise/parent-trap/Content?oid=930620. Additionally, many nonmarried
couples are involved in child-custody cases. Leonard Edwards, Comments on the Miller Com-
mission Report: A California Perspective, 27 PACE L. REV. 627, 659 (2007); Andrew Schepard,
The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to
Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L. REV. 395, 399 (2000). By way of
example, as of 2004, thirty-five percent of parents participating in mediation for custody disputes
in California had never been married. Edwards, supra, at 659.
7. See Douglas Darnall, Parental Alienation: Not in the Best Interest of the Children, 75 N.D. L.
REv. 323, 323 (1999) ("[Parental] alienation can occur in even the friendliest of divorces.").
8. Louann C. McGlynn, Recent Case, Parental Alienation: Trash Talking the Non-Custodial
Parent Is Not Okay, Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d 896, 77 N.D. L. REV.
525, 540 (2001); Niggemyer, supra note 4, at 570; see also Anita Vestal, Mediation and Parental
Alienation Syndrome: Considerations for an Intervention Model, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS.
REV. 487, 487 (1999) ("Many experts in family law ... have observed an increase in deceptive
and manipulative tactics used by divorcing couples.").
9. Saturday Today (NBC television broadcast Apr. 28, 2007).
10. See Donna J. Martinson, One Case-One Specialized Judge: Why Courts Have an Obliga-
tion to Manage Alienation and Other High-Conflict Cases, 48 FAM. CT. REv. 180, 182-83 (2010);
see also Kenneth H. Waldron & David E. Joanis, Understanding and Collaboratively Treating
Parental Alienation Syndrome, 10 AM. J. FAM. L. 121, 130 (1996) ("The American court system
is inherently adversarial, which does not serve the family in conflict well. The adversarial pro-
cess further alienates and polarizes. Unfortunately, the charges and countercharges inherent in a
PAS-involved family fit tongue-and-groove into the adversarial system.").
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tween the other parent and the child.' Referred to in this Article as
"parental alienation," 12 this type of behavior illustrates a parent's ulti-
mate disregard and disrespect for that relationship.13
11. See Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 48 (Minn. 1990) (Popovich, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he
parent-child relationship is increasingly threatened by family members."); see also Solangel Mal-
donado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After Divorce, 43 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REv. 441, 441 (2008) ("A divorced parent's anger toward the other parent can lead to
excessive conflict for years after the legal relationship has ended, harming both parents and their
children.").
12. The focus of this Article is parental alienation, not the similar-sounding parental aliena-
tion syndrome (PAS) with which it is often confused. RICHARD A. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL
ALIENATION SYNDROME, at xxviii (2d ed. 1998); see also Darnall, supra note 7, at 325-27 (dis-
cussing the distinction between parental alienation and PAS). PAS, a term coined by Dr. Rich-
ard Gardner in the 1980s, is defined as
a disorder that arises in the context of child-custody disputes. Its primary manifestation
is the child's campaign of denigration against a parent, a campaign that has no justifica-
tion. It results from the combination of a programming (brainwashing) parent's indoc-
trinations and the child's own contributions to the vilification of the target parent.
When true parental abuse and/or neglect is present the child's animosity may be justi-
fied, and so the parental alienation syndrome explanation for the child's hostility is not
applicable.
GARDNER, supra, at xx.
PAS and parental alienation differ in that parental alienation refers to a wide scope of behav-
ior and concerns only the alienator parent, whereas PAS focuses on a more narrow scope of
behavior and concerns the behavior of both the alienator parent and the child. See Darnall,
supra note 7, at 325-26; accord McGlynn, supra note 8, at 533. In comparing the two, some have
posited that PAS is a subcategory of parental alienation. E.g., Richard A. Gardner, Parental
Alienation Syndrome vs. Parental Alienation: Which Diagnosis Should Evaluators Use in Child-
Custody Disputes?, 30 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 93, 98-99 (2002); Turkat, supra note 3, at 143.
Although PAS has generated much controversy in both the mental health and legal fields, there
is little doubt that parental alienation exists, and has existed, for years. See, e.g., Fidler & Bala,
supra note 2, at 12 (noting that parental alienation "is not a new phenomenon"); Maldonado,
supra note 11, at 450; Turkat, supra note 3, at 131 ("Attorneys who litigate child custody cases
are accustomed to hearing clients charge that their children are being turned against them by the
other parent."); Young, supra note 6 ("Whether or not a psychological 'syndrome' exists, paren-
tal alienation clearly does."). As a news reporter glibly claimed, "[A]nybody old enough to
drink coffee knows that embittered parties to divorce can and do manipulate their children."
Kathleen Parker, Editorial, Syndrome or No, Alienation a Bad Result, SUN SENTINAL, May 18,
2006, at 17A; see also L.F. Lowenstein, Parental Alienation and the Judiciary, 67 MEoIco-
LEGAL J. 121, 121 (1999), available at http://www.nlada.orgDMS/Documents/1124116592.13/
LLowenstein%20-%2OParental%2OAlienation%20and%20the%20Judiciary.pdf.
Because this Article addresses parental alienation and not PAS, the propriety of referring to
PAS as a "syndrome" and the admissibility of expert testimony regarding PAS exceed the scope
of this Article.
13. This disrespect by some parents flies in the face of judicial recognition of the importance
of the parent-child relationship. Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1301 (N.H. 1983) (recognizing
the "sanctity in the union of parent and child"). The U.S. Supreme Court has also "recognized
that the relationship between [the] parent[s] and the child is constitutionally protected" and
"that the rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,"' consider-
ing those rights "far more precious ... than property rights." Laurel S. Banks, Note, Schutz v.
Schutz, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 105, 110 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953), respectively).
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As the hypothetical demonstrates, parents employ a vast array of
tactics to torture each other through their children. 14 Yet the law as it
currently stands does not offer a complete remedy for the damage that
alienated parents like Betty suffer,15 nor does it sufficiently deter pa-
rental alienation. Traditionally, alienated parents have turned to fam-
ily law for relief. In some cases, they have found courts hesitant to
redress the injuries that parental alienation inflicts upon their relation-
ship with their children. Even when that particular wrong is remedied
by family law, alienated parents like Betty are left without a remedy
for their resulting emotional distress. This is unsurprising, given that
family law is not designed to remedy emotional distress in any con-
text, including parental alienation. Moreover, the relief provided by
family law does not impose sufficient costs to deter alienating parents'
harmful conduct.
Therefore, in more recent times, alienated parents attempting to up-
grade their legal relief have turned to tort law.16 While parental alien-
ation, as a course of conduct, is nothing new to divorcing couples or
their attorneys t asserting a tort-based cause of action to remedy that
14. Maldonado, supra note 11, at 449 ("Angry spouses often hurt the other spouse any way
they can."); Kiran Krishnamurthy, Theory Issue in Custody Dispute, RICHMOND TIMES Dis-
PATCH, Nov. 12, 2006, at B1 ("[M]anipulative parents will go to extreme lengths to hurt a former
spouse.").
15. Such a parent has also been called the "target parent." See, e.g., Steinberger, supra note 3,
at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). The terms are used synonymously herein.
Certainly others are affected by parental alienation, including the child and the alienator par-
ent. See, e.g., Despina Vassiliou & Glenn F. Cartwright, The Lost Parents' Perspective on Paren-
tal Alienation Syndrome, 29 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 181, 182 (2001); Amy J.L. Baker & Katherine
Andre, Working with Alienated Children & Their Targeted Parents, ANNALS AM. PSYCHOTHER-
APY Ass'N, Summer 2008, at 10, 10. The scope of this Article is limited to the injury suffered by
the alienated parent.
16. See Joy M. Feinberg & Lori S. Loeb, Custody and Visitation Interference: Alternative Rem-
edies, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 271, 284 (1994) (noting the recent development of "the
integration of tort law into domestic relations actions through the recognition of domestic
torts"); C. David Bargamian, Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Child Cus-
tody Context: Proposed Guidelines, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 125, 142 (1989) ("[T]ort actions arising
out of divorce proceedings are on the rise."); Thomas B. Scheffey, State Courts Take Stronger
Stand on Parental Alienation, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2004, at 1 ("[I]nterest in finding new legal
tools to combat such behavior [as parental alienation] has steadily increased in recent years . . .
(quoting family lawyer Richard G. Kent)).
17. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 272 (referring to parental alienation syndrome as "a
common occurrence"); Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that parental alienation "is not
a new phenomenon"); see also Maldonado, supra note 11, at 449-50 ("Casebooks are filled with
cases involving divorcing spouses' vengeful behavior, and every matrimonial attorney and thera-
pist has dozens of stories about the lengths to which divorcing clients have resorted to exact
revenge on the other spouse, often using the children as pawns in their battles." (footnote
omitted)).
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conduct is.' Although courts have expressed concern about provid-
ing feuding parents such a cause of action, creative parental alienation
victims have nevertheless forced the judiciary into the foreign terri-
tory of analyzing parental alienation within the rubric of tort law.
When doing so, courts have attempted to force parental alienation
into existing tort causes of action, typically, alienation of affections or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sometimes both.19
Yet, existing tort-based claims do not effectively address or redress
parental alienation, leaving some alienated parents without a satisfac-
tory remedy and crying out for a new tort law "app" for parental
alienation.
With this background in mind, this Article is structured as follows.
Part II explores the concept of parental alienation by providing an
overview of such conduct, discussing how and why an alienator parent
alienates, and reviewing its deleterious effects upon alienated par-
ents.20 Part II then considers two sources of law-family law and tort
law-under which parental alienation could be attacked. 21 Although
many jurists, scholars, and lawyers favor one area of law over the
other, Part III posits that neither can wholly remedy the harms suf-
fered by alienated parents, given that each focuses on different harms
and offers different remedies. 22 Instead, both family law and tort law
play an important role in vindicating the rights of alienated parents.
Part III proposes that, given the inadequacy of existing tort law
claims, tort law should recognize a new cause of action specifically
tailored to parental alienation: "inappropriate parental influence." 23
Part III also develops this proposed new tort claim by suggesting its
elements, addressing the valid concerns surrounding the creation such
a tort, and ultimately concluding that the policy of protecting the par-
ent-child relationship should trump those concerns. 24
18. Segal v. Lynch, 993 A.2d 1229, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (referring to such a
tort-based remedy as "a novel, complex, and heretofore relatively unexplored area of the law");
Greg M. Geismann, Comment, Strengthening the Weak Link in the Family Law Chain: Child
Support and Visitation as Complementary Activities, 38 S.D. L. REV. 568, 598 (1993) (referring to
such tort actions as "a new trend").
19. Under very specific factual scenarios, courts may also look to causes of action such as
prima facie tort, interference with custody, or interference with visitation. See infra notes
173-181 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 25-83 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 84-227 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 228-234 and accompanying text.
23. The name of this proposed tort comes from a suggestion made by Judge Jeffrey S. Sun-
shine of the Supreme Court of New York in Kings County. NK v. MK, No. XXO7, 2007 WL
3244980. at *64 n.20 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 1, 2007).
24. See infra notes 235-313 and accompanying text.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. The Glitch: Parental Alienation
Sometimes referred to as "psychological kidnapping," 25 parental
alienation is a very broad term that refers to a wide scope of behavior.
In this Article, it means "any constellation of behaviors [by a parent],
whether conscious or unconscious, that could evoke a disturbance in
the relationship between a child and the targeted parent." 26 Parental
alienation is a gradual process that is directly related to the amount of
time an alienator parent invests in alienating behavior, making time
an alienator parent's greatest weapon. 27
1. Parental Alienation Techniques
Alienator parents employ a variety of alienating techniques, often-
times using several techniques in combination with each other. One
simple technique employed by an alienator parent is cutting off the
other parent's access to information about the child, for example, by
25. LINDA A. MOONEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PROBLEMS 173 (7th ed. 2011).
26. Darnall, supra note 7, at 325. Typically, this person is a parent who has a terminated
romantic relationship with the other parent. Of course, those other than a parent can engage in
alienating conduct in an attempt to damage the child's relationship with one or both of his par-
ents, but that situation is beyond the scope of this Article.
A California appellate court set forth a similar definition of parental alienation in 1949. See
McGlynn, supra note 8, at 532 ("[W]hen a parent pursues a consistent course of action calculated
to prevent any close relationship existing between the child and the other parent, causing the
child's mind to become 'poisoned and prejudiced' against the other parent." (citing Ludlow v.
Ludlow, 201 P.2d 579, 582 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949)).
The author recognizes that parental alienation could occur in the absence of a marital rupture,
although it is far less likely in that situation. See Walsh & Bone, supra note 3, at 93. When this
occurs, parental alienation should not be actionable for several reasons. First, some jurisdictions
bar lawsuits between spouses in most tort cases based on either interspousal immunity or public
policy grounds. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:291 (2008) (immunity); Vaughn v. Vaughn,
806 A.2d 787, 794 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (public policy and immunity); Day v. Heller, 653
N.W.2d 475, 478-81 (Neb. 2002) (public policy). Second, unlike a divorced parent, a married
parent residing with the child has the opportunity to counteract the other parent's alienating
conduct.
27. Katherine C. Andre, Parental Alienation Syndrome, ANNALS AM. PSYCHOTHERAPY
Ass'N, Winter 2004, at 7, 10 ("[T]here is a direct and inversely proportional relationship between
the amount of time spent with the alienating parent and the ease with which the rejected parent
relationship is restored."); see also Glenn F. Cartwright, Expanding the Parameters of Parental
Alienation Syndrome, 21 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 205, 209 (1993) (referring to time in the hands of
an alienating parent as "the primary weapon to inflict injury on the lost parent" and the aliena-
tor's manipulation of time as "the prime weapon"). By contrast, the alienated parent may lack
ample time with the child, resulting in her inability to combat the alienation tactics of the aliena-
tor parent. Cartwright, supra, at 209 ("[T]he lost parent needs time with the child to ensure that
contact is not completely lost and to prevent the alienation from completely destroying what
may be left of a normal, loving relationship.").
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denying him information about the child's activities28 or access to the
child's medical or school records. 29 Another technique is to limit the
other parent's contact with the child by refusing to allow telephone
conversations or Visits.30 The alienator parent may also try to mini-
mize the other parent's importance in the eyes of the child. To do so,
the alienator parent may ignore the other parent;3' make negative
comments about the other parent (sometimes criticizing his lifestyle or
character) in front of the child;32 destroy pictures of the other parent
or refuse to allow the child to have them;33 change the child's last
name;34 or not require the child to resolve conflicts with the other
parent (despite requiring the child to do so if he were feuding with a
third party), conveying to the child that his relationships with non-
family members are more important than his relationship with the
other parent.35 The alienator parent may also put the child in the mid-
dle of the alienator's relationship with the other parent by using the
child as a messenger or by discussing issues with the child that should
first be discussed with the other parent. 36 Another technique is for
the alienator parent to "blam[e] the other parent for financial or emo-
tional woes." 37
On the more severe side, an alienator parent may ask the child to
choose between his parents, convince the child that the other parent
does not care for the child, or convey that he is conditioning his own
28. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 272.
29. See Gail Rosenblum, Separate, and Not Equal, STAR TRIB., May 5, 2007, at El (highlight-
ing a story about "a mother renam[ing] the children ... so the father would not be notified about
their activities, medical histories or whereabouts").
30. See id. (highlighting a story about a mother who refused to answer her ex-husband's calls
for two years); Maria Vogel-Short, Millionaire Pursues New Marital Tort: Alienation of Chil-
dren's Affection, N.J. L.J. (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawAr-
ticleFriendly.jsp?id-900005558300 (discussing a New Jersey case in which a father alleged that
the mother "changed her phone number, blocked e-mails and cut off all contact with their two
children").
31. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 272.
32. Maldonado, supra note 11, at 454. The alienator parent may also encourage the child not
"to see both the good and not so good in the [alienated] parent." Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at
17. In fact, he may "put[] a spin on the rejected parent's flaws, which are exaggerated and
repeated." This then influences the child "to believe the rejected parent is unworthy and in
some cases abusive." Id. at 16. Consider the story of a mother who made her children pray for
their safety only on the nights before visits with their father, which quickly led to the children's
fear of being alone with their father. Janell Ross, Therapists Split on 'Parental Alienation,' TEN-
NESSEAN, Dec. 27, 2009, at 1B.
33. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 272; Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 17.
34. Vogel-Short, supra note 30.
35. See LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6:26 (2004); Fidler
& Bala, supra note 2, at 17.
36. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 272; Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 19.
37. Vogel-Short, supra note 30.
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love for the child upon the child's rejection of the other parent.38 A
similarly severe alienating tactic is causing the child to distrust or fear
the other parent by convincing the child that the other parent cannot
properly care for him. For example, after the child returns from
spending time with the other parent, the alienator parent may engage
in a derogatory interrogation or physical inspection of the child, or
offer "judgmental, opinionated and negative comments" about the
alienated parent's child-care abilities. 39 The most severe tactic occurs
when an alienating parent clandestinely takes the child away without
the permission or knowledge of the other parent, effectively kidnap-
ping the child. 40 Additionally, an alienator parent may also use physi-
cal punishment to remedy a child's resistance to his alienation
efforts.41
2. Motives for Parental Alienation
The motives prompting parental alienation vary,42 and opinions
about this issue have been offered for some sixty years.43 Today, most
scholars believe that parental alienation is caused by some deficiency
in the psychological makeup of the alienator parent.44 Some of these
38. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 272.
39. Id.
40. One news column detailed the story of a mother who received a phone call telling her that
her children were killed in a car crash, while the children were actually with their father. Mike
Jeffries, Parental Alienation: There's No Co-Parenting Happening, BASIL & SPICE (Aug. 11,
2010), http://www.basilandspice.com/love-and-relationships/82010-parental-alienation-theres-no-
co-parenting-happening.html [hereinafter Jeffries, No Co-Parenting]. The father, meanwhile, al-
legedly told the children that their mother had "abandoned them, was dead, in the Army, or the
Peace Corps." Id. Another highlighted a father who kidnapped his son at age two and told him
that his mother was "a demonized whore who wanted nothing to do with the child, and that she
had died." BRYAN LEE McGLOTHIN, HAVE You SEEN MY MOTHER (2005). Another
presented facts showing that a mother encouraged her children "to run away from their father,
or throw stones, spit on or hit him, which they did." See Scheffey, supra note 16.
41. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 273.
42. Darnall, supra note 7, at 323 ("[Any number of events can destroy the fragile balance of
peace between parents."); see also Walsh & Bone, supra note 3, at 93 (noting the "complex
network of . . . motives" surrounding parental alienation syndrome).
43. William Bernet, Parental Alienation Disorder and DSM-V, 36 Am. J. FAM. THERAPY 349,
352 (2008); see also Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 12 ("[C]ertain personality types amongst
divorced parents defend themselves from narcissist injury by fighting for custody of the child and
defaming the partner in an effort to rob the other parent of the pleasure of the child." (describ-
ing the 1949 opinion of psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich)). In the 1980s, others posited that paren-
tal alienation is the result of a combination of the alienator parent's narcissism and anger, and
the child's vulnerability. E.g., Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 12 ("Wallerstein and Kelly (1980)
referred to an 'unholy alliance between a narcissistically enraged parent and a particularly vul-
nerable older child or adolescent, who together waged battle in efforts to hurt and punish the
other parent."').
44. See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 8, at 490.
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scholars believe that alienators are sociopaths, 45 while others believe
that they suffer from personality disorders, 4 6 mental illness,47 or an
inability to "individuate" herself from the child.48 Others think that
alienator parents are just impulsive and deceitful people who lack
feelings of empathy, sympathy, or guilt. 4 9
Alienating conduct serves different functions for different alienator
parents. Some of these parents engage in alienating conduct for self-
protection.50 For example, alienating conduct can offset an "[aliena-
tor] parent's feelings of inadequacy, lack of self-worth, [or] powerless-
ness" or can calm fears of potential judicial proceedings.5' It can also
protect an alienator parent from her feelings about "a past history of
abandonment, alienation, [or] physical or sexual abuse." 52 Finally, en-
gaging in alienating conduct can assuage the alienator parent's fear of
losing the child53 or her own role as primary parent,54 and satisfies the
alienator parent's desire to control the child.55
Some alienator parents engage in alienating conduct not in some
delusional attempt to help themselves but, instead, to hurt the other
parent. For example, alienating conduct can be used to combat jeal-
ousy of the other parent,56 satisfy an alienator's desire for ven-
geance,57 or obtain leverage over the other parent during the division
of marital property or the establishment of child support or alimony.58
45. See Leona M. Kopetski, Identifying Cases of Parent Alienation Syndrome-Part II, COLo.
LAw., Mar. 1998, at 61.
46. Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 11, 18; Martinson, supra note 10, at 181-82.
47. Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 11 ("[T]here are indeed ... women consciously, or uncon-
sciously, motivated by vengeance or due to personality disorders or mental illness who may
alienate their children from fathers . . . ."); see also Robert A. Evans, Treatment Considerations
with Children Diagnosed with PAS, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2006, at 69, 70.
48. Jayne A. Major, Parents Who Have Successfully Fought Parental Alienation Syndrome,
BREAKTHORUGH PARENTING, http://www.breakthroughparenting.com/PAS.htm (last visited July
9, 2011) (explaining that successful alienators are "unable to see the child as a separate human
being from him or herself").
49. Jeffries, No Co-Parenting, supra note 40.
50. ELROD, supra note 35, § 6:26; Bernet, supra note 43, at 352; Feinberg & Loeb, supra note
16, at 274; Waldron & Joanis, supra note 10, at 126.
51. Walsh & Bone, supra note 3, at 93.
52. Id. at 94; accord Waldron & Joanis, supra note 10, at 126.
53. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 274; Waldron & Joanis, supra note 10, at 126.
54. Vestal, supra note 8, at 490; Waldron & Joanis, supra note 10, at 126.
55. ELROD, supra note 35, § 6:26; Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 274; Vestal, supra note 8,
at 490; Waldron & Joanis, supra note 10, at 122, 126; Walsh & Bone, supra note 3, at 93-94.
56. ELROD, supra note 35, § 6:26; Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 274; Waldron & Joanis,
supra note 10, at 126; Walsh & Bone, supra note 3, at 93-94.
57. ELROD, supra note 35, § 6:26; Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16 at 274; Vestal, supra note 8,
at 490; Waldron & Joanis, supra note 10, at 122, 126.
58. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 274; Vestal, supra note 8, at 490.
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3. Deleterious Effects of Parental Alienation upon Alienated
Parents
Parental alienation usually begins somewhat benignly, 59 with many
alienator parents claiming that they are just being honest with the
child about the other parent.60 This conduct has potential to harm
everyone involved, and, when the alienator parent succeeds in causing
the child to reject the other parent, it is nothing short of a tragedy.
Although this Article focuses on designing a remedy for the alienator
parent's injury, if this remedy also deters alienating conduct, then the
recognition of such a remedy could benefit children,61 the alienator
parent,62 and society. 63
59. Darnall, supra note 7, at 323 ("[Parental] alienation usually begins without any malicious
or conscious intent to harm or destroy the relationship between the other parent and the
children.").
60. Jann Blackstone-Ford & Sharyl Jupe, Bad-Mouthing an Ex? The Child Ultimately Suffers,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 5, 2005, at 8E; see also Douglas Darnall, New Definition of Parental
Alienation: What Is the Difference Between Parental Alienation (PA) and Parental Alienation
Syndrome (PAS)?, PsYCARE (1997), http://www.parentalalienation.org/articles/parental-
alienation-defined.html ("One parent can alienate the children against the other parent simply
by harping on faults that are real and provable.").
61. A child exposed to parental alienation is as much a victim as his alienated parent (if not
more). In fact, the American Bar Association's Family Law Section has recognized that "the
legal system in most states is not currently adequate to protect children from [parental aliena-
tion]." Vestal, supra note 8, at 501 (referring to a "12-year research study of 700 to 1,000 cases of
programmed and brainwashed children"). A child is harmed by a parent's alienating conduct
regardless of whether the parent succeeds in turning the child against the other parent because
the alienator parent disengages from appropriate parenting. Maldonado, supra note 11, at
457-59. Instead of offering the emotional support the child needs in order to cope with the
breakup of the family, an alienator parent becomes obsessed with his own emotions (anger,
depression, and humiliation) in the midst or in the wake of a divorce. The alienator parent's
disengagement can continue beyond issues related to the divorce. A child who resists the aliena-
tor parent's conduct by showing affection for or loyalty to the other parent may suffer from
feelings of disloyalty or betrayal toward the alienator parent, causing the child to feel torn be-
tween his parents and causing him emotional distress and adjustment difficulties. See Fidler &
Bala, supra note 2, at 20-21. The effects of parental alienation can be so severe that they can
mimic those suffered by children who lose a parent to death. Cartwright, supra note 27, at 212.
Further, a successful parental alienation can cause additional problems as the child matures.
According to one study, some alienated children suffered from substance abuse problems during
their adolescence. Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 21.
62. Some research indicates that the alienator parent also suffers because of her own alienat-
ing conduct. Although the alienator parent may initially enjoy feelings of victory and revenge
after successfully alienating the child from the other parent, these feelings may be short-lived.
This is because some alienator parents later experience guilt or regret for their behavior. If not,
they may possibly feel sympathy toward the child whom they deprived of an important parental
relationship. Cartwright, supra note 27, at 213. Further, many successfully alienated children,
once they reach adulthood, resent the alienator parent and shift their affiliation to the alienated
parent. Rosalind Sedacca, Emotional Scarring from Divorce Affects I in 4 Kids, Most Ages
9 to 12, BASIL & SPIcE (Dec. 18, 2009). http://www.basilandspice.com/love-and-relationships/
emotional-scarring-from-divorce-affects-1-in-4-kids-most-age.html.
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Parental alienation financially and. emotionally plagues alienated
parents,6 4 who often do not initially recognize the signs. 65  One self-
proclaimed victim reported that it was incomprehensible how he
"went from Adored Dad to Despised Dad in the blink of an eye." 6 6
Not surprisingly, every alienated parent participating in one study re-
ported that he would never want to experience such a thing again. 67
Even when the alienator parent's efforts do not ultimately destroy
the relationship between the other parent and the child, alienating
conduct still negatively affects that relationship. In such situations,
the alienator parent's conduct results in a power shift from the other
parent to the child.68 For example, when the alienator parent gives
the child the power to determine whether, when, and under what cir-
cumstances to see the other parent, an alienated parent may hesitate
to discipline the child, taking caution not to anger him.6 9 This fear of
upsetting the fragile parent-child relationship leaves the alienated
parent feeling powerless to freely and properly parent.70
When an alienator parent's conduct leads a child to reject the other
parent, the alienated parent's emotional response usually includes a
"sense of powerlessness and frustration";7' "stress, loss, grief, anger,
and fear"; 72 and feelings of pain, anxiety, deficiency, humiliation, and
being unloved. 73 As one self-proclaimed alienated parent noted, "To
have that human connection [between oneself and one's child] taken
away from you is probably one of the most difficult and painful things
63. Some of the problems suffered by those involved in parental alienation, particularly sub-
stance abuse, proclivity for criminal activity, and psychological damage, may also burden society
at large.
64. Vassiliou & Cartwright, supra note 15, at 186; see also Rosenblum, supra note 29 (detailing
one man's experience with parental alienation, which cost him approximately $100,000 in legal
fees).
65. Mike Jeffries, Cuba's Poster Boy for Parental Alienation: Elian Gonzalez, BASIL & SPICE
(July 2, 2010), http://www.basilandspice.com/love-and-relationships/72010-cubas-poster-boy-for-
parental-alienation-elian-gonzale.html.
66. Mike Jeffries, Parental Alienation 2070: You Are NOT Alone, BASIL & SPICE (Mar. 10,
2010), http://www.basilandspice.com/love-and-relationships/parental-alienation-2010-you-are-
not-alone.html.
67. Vassiliou & Cartwright, supra note 15, at 189-90.
68. See id. at 185.
69. Id. at 187, 189.
70. Id.
71. Baker & Darnall, supra note 2, at 100.
72. Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 14.
73. Sandra Scantling, A Father Fears His Wife Is Turning the Kids Against Him, HARTFORD
COURANT, Oct. 28, 2007, at H4; Parental Alienation Awareness Organization Joins Many in
Washington, D.C. on August 18th to Commemorate Family Preservation Day, PR NEWSWIRE
(Aug. 9, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/parental-alienation-awareness-organi
zation-joins-many-in-washington-dc-on-august-18th-to-commemorate-family-preservation-day-
58006327.html (describing the alienated parent's experience as "excruciatingly painful").
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for any parent to deal with." 74 Additionally, these feelings of pain and
suffering are sometimes exacerbated by some outsiders, who at least
partially blame the alienated parent for the child's rejection by point-
ing to the alienated parent's flaws.75 The intense emotions suffered by
an alienated parent can cause him to lash out, even at the child.76
Ultimately, 't]he [alienated] parent experiences the anguish of the
loss of a child," 77 which in turn causes that parent immense mental
pain and suffering.78 This is similar to the loss of a child to death,79
but in some ways, it can seem worse to the alienated parent because
the alienated parent's feeling of loss is combined with her continuing
concern for the child.80 Even though these alienated parents want to
restore their relationship with their children and will "try anything to
end the impasse,"8 eventually some alienated parents give up on the
parent-child relationship.8 2 Some have even attempted suicide. 3
B. Proper Law to Address Parental Alienation
The longtime existence of parental alienation, and its lack of correl-
ative consequences, is a problem with great costs.8 4 Unless effective
deterrents to parental alienation are implemented, it is a fair predic-
tion that the alienation will continue.85 The question then arises:
74. Saturday Today (NBC television broadcast Apr. 28, 2007); see also Parker, supra note 12
(describing parental alienation's effect on the alienated parent as "agony").
75. See Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 14.
76. Take, for example, the highly publicized voicemail left by actor, Alec Baldwin, for his
daughter, Ireland, in which Mr. Baldwin called his daughter a "rude, thoughtless, little pig."
NBC Today Show (NBC television broadcast Apr. 26, 2007). According to Mr. Baldwin, his
unacceptable behavior toward his daughter was triggered by the alienation tactics of his ex-wife,
Kim Basinger. Id.
77. Cartwright, supra note 27, at 212.
78. Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 14.
79. See Iowa Governor Thomas J. Vilsack Proclaims April 25th as Parental Alienation A ware-
ness Day, PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 27, 2006), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/iowa-
governor-thomas-j-vilsack-proclaims-april-25th-as-parental-alienation-awareness-day-57229367.
html (comparing the pain of the alienated parent to "bereavement without end").
80. Cartwright, supra note 27, at 213.
81. Mike Jeffries, Dr. Phil and Parental Alienation, Not a Good Choice, BASIL & SPICE
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.basilandspice.com/love-and-relationships/92010-dr-phil-and-parental-
alienation-not-a-good-choice.html (hereinafter Jeffries, Dr. Phil].
82. Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 122 ("[Alienated parents sometimes] cease to pursue their
role of wishing to play a part in their childrens' [sic] lives."); Harvey Brownstone, That Toxic
Tug-of-War, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 25, 2009, at A15 ("Many non-custodial parents simply walk
away from an impossible situation, devastated to lose contact with their children, but consoled to
know that their children's exposure to a toxic tug-of-war is over.").
83. See Foreword to McGLOTHIN, supra note 40.
84. See Vogel-Short, supra note 30.
85. See McGlynn, supra note 8, at 546.
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Which source of law-family law or tort law-is the proper one under
which to address parental alienation?
Traditionally, judges, scholars, and practitioners choose one avenue
or the other, with many deeming family law to be the most appropri-
ate legal regime to handle parental alienation. These individuals be-
lieve that family courts should hold exclusive jurisdiction over all
claims related to the parent-child relationship, including parental
alienation, 6 positing that allowing tort claims for familial issues would
"undermine or distort the established family law process."87 Others,
believing that family law remedies are inadequate and sometimes in-
appropriate in the context of parental alienation," claim that parental
alienation claims draw attention to a colossal problem with the family
law system. They suggest that the more suitable remedy lies with tort
law in the civil courts.8 9 Historically, however, tort law has played
only a tangential role in addressing parental alienation, as it has been
utilized only by the occasional alienated parent who has asserted tort
theories that, as discussed further, are not designed to address this
particular problem. 90
86. See Davis v. Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 976-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Gross, J., concur-
ring specially) (opining that issues like parental alienation "are best handled in a family [court]"
because of the speed with which it can handle the problem); Linda L. Berger, Lies Between
Mommy and Daddy: The Case for Recognizing Spousal Emotional Distress Claims Based on
Domestic Deceit that Interferes with Parent-Child Relationships, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 449, 510
(2000); see also Lapides v. Trabbic, 758 A.2d 1114, 1118 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (providing
that interference with visitation is "not the type of action[] ... that transform[s] a family law
issue into a tort claim").
87. Berger, supra note 86, at 524; see also In re Marriage of Segel, 224 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (Ct.
App. 1986) (opining that recognizing a tort would undermine family law, which is designed "to
regulate and supervise the care, custody and financial support of minor children whose parents
are the subject of dissolution proceedings"); Davis, 780 So. 2d at 976 (Gross, J., concurring spe-
cially) (concluding that "the family court is uniquely positioned" to correct violations of statu-
tory parental rights, minimize harm, and fashion remedies). One attorney has been quoted for
the proposition that "the whole point of family court is to safeguard the children's needs.
[Alienation of affection] cases are the proper province of family court . . . ." Carmel Sileo,
Seeking New Marital Tort, Frustrated Father Takes Divorce Case to Civil Court, TRIAL (Jan. 1,
2008), avaiable at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Seeking+new+marital+tort,+frustrated+father+
takes+divorce+case+to...-a0174282021 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, that same
lawyer acknowledged that "'maybe 1 in 10 cases' would qualify as so extreme that they could not
be remedied there." Id. He went on: "[T]here certainly are some extreme cases where a civil
remedy may be the only option. In those cases, people absolutely should have the right to bring
a lawsuit." Id.
88. See, e.g., Niggemyer, supra note 4, at 589.
89. See, e.g., John Appezzato, Appellate Court Inherits Debate About Alienation-of-Affection
Suits, NJ.com (Dec. 19, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/topstories/index.ssfl
2008/12/appellate-courtinherits debat.html ("I believe you can't get justice in these alienation
cases in the family court." (quoting Woodbridge attorney John Paone Jr.)).
90. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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Forcing parental alienation into one area of the law is a mistake.
Relief for parental alienation should not be an "either/or" proposi-
tion. Because of the dual nature of an alienated parent's injuries-
harm to his relationship with his child, on the one hand, and emo-
tional distress on the other-neither family law nor tort law, standing
alone, has the capacity to offer complete relief. This is not due to any
failure on the part of either source of law, but rather their respective
focuses. For example, preserving and repairing relationships lies at
the heart of family law.91 Thus, family law can redress an alienated
parent's first harm (his damaged relationship with his child), but it
cannot remedy the second (his emotional distress). By contrast, tort
law focuses on compensating the wrongfully injured and deterring
blameworthy and harmful conduct, 92 frequently allowing recovery for
damage to relationships (such as wrongful death, loss of consortium,
and interference with business or contractual relations). Therefore,
tort law can redress an alienated parent's second harm but not his
first. Ultimately, each area of law has a very important role to play in
the parental alienation context, and each offers unique remedies (that
address different injuries) to alienated parents.
Therefore, family law and tort law should complement each other
and serve dual purposes for alienated parents. More specifically, an
alienated parent should employ family law to repair his relationship
with his child and "to discourage future disparagement by the alienat-
ing parent,"93 and under certain, limited circumstances, he should also
be allowed to employ tort law to "salv[e] the pain of the alienated
parent through monetary compensation." 94
1. The Old Equipment: Family Law's Role in Remedying Parental
Alienation
Because of the plethora of remedial tools in its arsenal, 95 family law
offers a wide variety of relief to alienated parents. While these family
law tools may salvage the parent-child relationship in some parental
91. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 86, at 510 ("[T]he purpose of the child custody and support
provisions [in a state's family law] is to preserve parent-child relationships and to enforce paren-
tal rights and obligations.").
92. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 1 (2006) ("[T]ort law has a deterrent function, imposing liability for con-
duct below the acceptable standard of care." (footnote omitted)); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAw I 71.03(E), at 343 (1999) ("A familiar rationale for tort damages is
that of deterrence.").
93. Niggemyer, supra note 4, at 587.
94. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.B.2.
95. Davis v. Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Gross, J., concurring
specially).
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alienation cases, they may not be available or effective for all parental
alienation cases. Furthermore, the universal problem with all family
law remedies is that they can never remedy an alienated parent's emo-
tional distress because doing so simply is not within the purview of
family law.
Most alienated parents' first line of defense against parental aliena-
tion is an attempt to gain custody of their child-either initially or by
a change of custody, depending on the timing of the parental aliena-
tion. In making initial custody decisions,96 courts in most jurisdictions
employ a "best interest of the child" standard,97 under which they
consider a variety of factors. 98 Some courts have explicitly stated that
parental alienation is "an act inconsistent with the best interest of the
child." 99 Many courts, in justifying such a statement, point particu-
larly to two of the "best interest" factors recognized in most jurisdic-
tions: (1) each party's willingness and ability to facilitate and
encourage the child's close and continuing relationship with the other
parent'00 and (2) the moral fitness of the parent. 01
Some jurisdictions describe the parents' willingness and ability to
facilitate and encourage the child's relationship with the other parent
as "important"'102 or "significant," 103 and many courts base initial cus-
tody and custody-modification decisions on this factor, among others.
For example, in Orrill v. Orrill, a Louisiana appellate court affirmed
the trial court's decision to award custody to the father, finding that
the mother was unwilling and unable to facilitate and encourage a
96. Typically, even when parents agree to joint custody, the court must assess the best interest
of the child before awarding it. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 132 (1999); Gainer-Jennings
v. Jennings, No. FA104113000S, 2010 WL 4722461, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2010);
Roguska v. Roguska, No. 291352, 2009 WL 3119630, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2009).
97. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(a) (repl.
vol. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(1)(a) (LexisNexis 1953 & repl. vol. 2007).
98. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2010); Orrill v. Orrill, 5 So. 3d 279, 282-83 (La. Ct.
App. 2009); Price v. Price, 611 N.W.2d 425, 430 (S.D. 2000). Note, however, that some states
have no statutory factors.
99. Lauren R. v. Ted R., No. 203699-02, 2010 WL 2089283, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 2010)
(citing Zeis v. Slater, 870 N.Y.S.2d 387 (App. Div. 2008); Zafran v. Zafran, 814 N.Y.S.2d 669
(App. Div. 2006); Bobinski v. Bobinski, 780 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 2004); Stern v. Stern, 758
N.Y.S.2d 155 (App. Div. 2003)).
100. E.g., Orrill, 5 So. 3d at 285-86; Ciannamea v. McCoy, 760 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (App. Div.
2003); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(8); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(2); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(5) (2010).
101. E.g., Goodwin v. Goodwin, 618 So. 2d 579, 586 (La. Ct. App. 1993) Renaud v. Renaud,
721 A.2d 463, 466 (Vt. 1998); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134(6); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
10(1)(a)(i); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717.
102. Orrill, 5 So. 3d at 285.
103. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(c) (West 2001).
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close and continuing relationship between the child and the father.104
In that case, the mother unnecessarily exposed the child to police in-
tervention on four occasions in the course of one year, adding more
trauma to the child's life and creating a false fear of the father's
drinking. 05
Similarly, in Grigsby v. Grigsby, a Florida appellate court affirmed
the award of custody to the father because the mother "actively inter-
fered with the love and emotional ties that previously existed between
the [f]ather and the children." 0 6 In Grigsby, the mother refused to
encourage the children to participate in scheduled time-sharing with
their father, threatened to obtain an injunction when the father at-
tended the children's school functions and sports activities, and re-
fused to comply with a subsequent court order regarding time-
sharing.107 She also falsely reported to authorities that the father was
sexually abusing the children, which kept the father from the children;
filed various police reports falsely alleging criminal activity by the fa-
ther (unrelated to the children); refused to cooperate with the court-
appointed parenting coordinator; and filed complaints against the li-
censes of the court-appointed psychologists and social workers, falsely
contending that these professionals were biased against her and,
therefore, acting unethically.108
In addition to considering a parent's alienating conduct as a viola-
tion of her responsibility to foster the child's relationship with the
other parent, many courts also consider it relevant to her moral fit-
ness.109 Several courts have found that engaging in parental aliena-
tion indicates a "strong likelihood of unfitness."110 For example, in
104. See Orrill, 5 So. 3d at 285-87.
105. Id. at 286.
106. Grigsby v. Grigsby, 39 So. 3d 453, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
107. Id. at 455-56.
108. Id. at 456; see also In re Marriage of Hake, No. 97,737, 2007 WL 2080539, at *4-6 (Kan.
Ct. App. July 20, 2007) (awarding custody to the father because, given the mother's alienation
tactics, the father was in the best position to facilitate a relationship between the children and
both parents); Cloutier v. Lear, 691 A.2d 660, 661-63 (Me. 1997) (awarding custody to the father
because, among other things, the mother and her family denigrated him to his children); McIn-
tire v. Hake (In re McIntire), 33 S.W.3d 565, 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (awarding custody to the
mother because the father attempted to alienate their daughter, inhibited the mother-daughter
relationship, and failed to involve mother in child rearing decisions).
109. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134(6) (1999); Renaud v. Renaud, 721 A.2d 463, 466
(Vt. 1998).
110. Lauren R. v. Ted R., No. 203699-02, 2010 WL 2089283, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25,
2010); see also Goodwin v. Goodwin, 618 So. 2d 579, 586 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Renaud, 721 A.2d
at 466 ("[A] sustained course of conduct by one parent designed to interfere in the child's rela-
tionship with the other casts serious doubt upon. the fitness of the offending party to be the
custodial parent.").
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M. W. v. S. W., a New York court found that, for at least two years, the
mother had demeaned the father and made disparaging remarks
about him to others in front of the children.' 1 Additionally, she
threatened to make their father's life "a living hell" in front of their
children.'1 2 The court found her behavior to be "a form of alienation
which reflects adversely upon [her] fitness."11 3 Similarly, in Palazzolo
v. Mire, a Louisiana appellate court explained that "moral fitness in-
cludes a parent's attitudes toward the other parent," 114 and the court
weighed this factor against the alienator parent.115
One problem with a custody-related remedy for most alienated par-
ents in many jurisdictions is one of timing. Oftentimes, alienation
does not occur until after an initial custody award is made, 16 and an
alienated parent must therefore seek a modification of the custody
award. This, in turn, means that the alienated parent, as the one seek-
ing to modify custody, must make a higher showing than just the best
interest of the child in order to succeed. Courts generally change cus-
tody only when doing so is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child"' 7 and the party seeking modification can show a change in cir-
cumstances of the child or the parties.1 18 This showing is typically sat-
isfied in situations when the child's present environment endangers his
physical or emotional health or impairs his emotional development,
and the harm likely to be caused. by a change of environment is out-
weighed by the advantage of a change to the child.119 While some
111. M.W. v. S.W., No. 3942/02, 2007 WL 1228613, at *14 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2007) (noting that
among the words the mother used to describe plaintiff, in the presence of the children, were
"deadbeat," "bastard," and "asshole").
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Palazzolo v. Mire, 10 So. 3d 748, 775 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Goodwin, 618 So. 2d at
586).
115. Id.; see also J.F. v. L.F. (In re J.F.), 694 N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (Fam. Ct. 1999) ("Indeed, a
custodial parent's interference with the relationship between a child and a noncustodial parent
has been said to be an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the child as to per se raise a
strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent." (quoting Young
v. Young, 628 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
116. See, e.g., Waldron & Joanis, supra note 10, at 129 (explaining that the severity of parental
alienation will depend on several factors, including the amount of time the child spends with the
alienator parent).
117. See, e.g., T.C.T.B.M. v. B.T., No. 2090370, 2010 WL 3722549, at *5 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept.
24, 2010); Vasquez v. Ortiz, 909 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (App. Div. 2010); Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d
863, 870 (Okla. 2001).
118. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(d); In re Kosek, 871 A.2d 1, 5 (N.H. 2005).
119. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(d)(iv) (West 2006);:Wilcher v. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d
173, 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.340 (LexisNexis repl. vol. 2010)).
Some courts require additional or different showings. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Thielges, 623
N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (requiring a change of circumstances and an ability to
minister more effectively to the children's well-being).
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courts acknowledge that parental alienation is "a nefarious form of
conduct that must be met with careful consideration and immediate,
comprehensive remediation,"120 the reality is that many courts hesi-
tate to modify custody decrees, 121 reserving the remedy for situations
in which the custodial parent has violated court orders.122 Further,
most courts refuse to change custody when the parent seeking the
change merely fears future alienation; these courts instead demand
proof that active alienation is occurring at the time the custody modi-
fication is sought.123
A second problem with custody modification is the potentially
harmful effect on the child. Some courts are reluctant to modify cus-
tody because they fear that disrupting a child's life would, in effect,
punish the child for the alienator parent's conduct.124 Also, some
courts, like some mental health professionals,125 question the effec-
tiveness of a change of custody as a remedy for parental alienation,
characterizing the remedy as "drastic" 126 or "extreme." 127 Imagine
120. Lauren R. v. Ted R., No. 203699-02, 2010 WL 2089283, at *1 (Sup. Ct. May 25, 2010)
(citing Lew v. Sobel, 849 N.Y.S.2d 586 (App. Div. 2007); Zafran v. Zafran, 814 N.Y.S.2d 669
(App. Div. 2006)).
121. H. Joseph Gitlin, When a Parent Bases Transfer of Custody on PAS, CI. DAILY L.
BULL., Mar. 8, 2010 at 6, 6 ("[I]t has taken an extremely strong situation before a court of review
has ruled that custody should be transferred because the custodial parent has alienated the child
from the noncustodial parent.").
122. Major, supra note 48.
123. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 600 N.W.2d 869, 874 (N.D. 1999). But see Hanna v. Hanna,
No. CA 09-214, 2010 WL 183413 (Ark. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2010) (demonstrating that it is not
necessary that a parent successfully alienate before the court is justified in changing custody).
124. See, e.g., V.U. v. L.U., No. FM-15-0468-03-C, 2006 WL 2707346, at *4-6 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Sept. 22, 2006) (refusing to transfer custody in the face of alienation and medical
recommendations because it would punish the children); Renaud v. Renaud, 721 A.2d 463, 466
(Vt. 1998) ("Children are not responsible for the misconduct of their parents toward each other,
and will not be uprooted from their home merely to punish a wayward parent."). This is not to
say that parents are never successful in obtaining a modification to the custody award. See, e.g.,
In re Marriage of Divelbiss, 719 N.E.2d 375, 381-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (affirming the transfer of
custody due to the mother's conduct in alienating the child from the father); Mullins v. Mullins,
490 N.E.2d 1375, 1391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (affirming the transfer of custody due to the custodial
parent's failure to allow visitation and other alienating misconduct); In re Marriage of Rosenfeld,
524 N.W.2d 212, 214-15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (transferring custody from the father to the
mother because of his and his new wife's alienating behavior); J.F. v. L.F. (In re J.F.), 694
N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (Fam. Ct. 1999) (transferring custody to the father from the mother due to the
"mother's constant and consistent single-minded teaching of the children that their father is
dangerous" and her inability and unwillingness to support the father's visitation (quoting Young
v. Young, 628 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div. 1995)).
125. See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston, Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and Refuse Visita-
tion: Recent Research and Social Policy Implications for the Alienated Child, 38 FAM. L.O. 757,
773-74 (2005) ("Only in those relatively rare situations where the aligned parent is found to be
psychotic, severely character-disordered, or a serious abduction risk, and has corresponding seri-
ous parenting deficits do we consider a change of custody warranted.").
126. Palazzolo v. Mire, 10 So. 3d at 748, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
132
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the reaction of a child who has been alienated against a parent to a
modification of custody that results in her spending more time with
that very parent. Changing custody to the alienated parent "is like
throwing a child who is afraid of reptiles into a snake pit."1 2 8 Finally,
at least one court has stated that a change of custody "has not been
proven scientifically to be successful" in parental alienation cases. 129
Other family law remedies fare no better at universally remedying
parental alienation cases. For example, courts often turn to mental
health professionals for answers to accusations of parental aliena-
tion.130 Courts see therapy, which can be ordered for one, some, or all
of those involved in or affected by parental alienation,131 as the key to
preventing continuing litigation (thereby reducing a court's case load)
and equipping an alienated parent with the necessary tools to repair
and sustain a relationship with his child.132 While therapy may be
helpful in some parental alienation cases, it is subject to many criti-
cisms. Some condemn it for its coercive nature1 33 and financial bur-
127. See Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 277. Some commentators refer to a transfer of
custody and an order for contact between the alienating parent and the child as "[t]he strongest
response to a parent who alienates a child." Rachel Birnbaum & Nicholas Bala, Toward the
Differentiation of High-Conflict Families: An Analysis of Social Science Research and Canadian
Case Law, FAM. CT. REV., July 2010, at 403, 413; accord Robert Z. Dobrish, PretrialApproaches
to Divorce and Custody in New York, in NEW YORK FAMILY LAW STRATEGIEs 7, 10 (Jo Alice
Darden ed., 2009) (referring to a change of custody as "[t]he most radical approach").
128. Dobrish, supra note 127, at 10.
129. Palazzolo, 10 So. 3d at 774.
130. See, e.g., J.F. v. L.F. (In re J.F.), 694 N.Y.S.2d 592, 600 (Fam. Ct. 1999); Johnson v.
Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 835-36 (N.D. 1993); White v. Williamson, 453 S.E.2d 666, 677 (W.
Va. 1994); see also Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 12. Dr. Gardner professed that "j]udges
are quick to refer PAS families into treatment." Richard A. Gardner, The Role of the Judiciary
in the Entrenchment of the Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS), CUSTODY CENTER, http://
www.custodycenter.com/PAS/pasnewsletter.pdf.
131. Some courts have focused therapy on the alienator parent, recognizing that the relation-
ship between the child and the alienated parent may never recover without mandated treatment
for the alienator parent. See, e.g., Haber v. McNally, No. FA064104074S, 2010 WL 5030121, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2010); Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 603 N.W.2d 896, 903 (N.D.
2000). However, some in the psychiatry field recommend therapy for both parents individually
as well as therapy for the child and the alienated parent in order to restore their damaged rela-
tionship. Baker & Darnall, supra note 2, at 119-20. Some courts agree. See, e.g., J.F., 694
N.Y.S.2d at 600.
132. Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 12; see also Brownstone, supra note 82 ("[F]amily
counseling and therapy are the most important resources that separated parents need to over-
come their pain and anger."). The goal of therapy in parental alienation situations "is for the
child to have a comfortable, healthy, and mutually satisfying relationship with both of his or her
parents." Bernet, supra note 43, at 360. But see Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 122 ("Judges are
reluctant to advise that therapy should take place . . . .").
133. Most alienated children ordered by the court to attend therapy sessions react with, at
best, reluctance and, at worst, resistance. See Dobrish, supra note 127, at 10. Not surprisingly,
alienator parents react similarly to court-mandated therapy for the child because they have no
desire to see the damaged relationship between the alienated parent and the child repaired. Id.;
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den,134 as well as for the idea that it is too little, too late.13 5 Others
question the effectiveness of therapy for the alienator parent.136 Still
others believe that therapy not only is ineffective in severe and some
moderate alienation cases, but that it can actually backfire.' 37
Another remedial tool for parental alienation is a court-mandated
parenting program,'38 which educates parents about the process of di-
vorce and how it affects them and their children. 139 "Some believe
these specialized programs may be the best hope for reducing conflict
and teaching parents how to communicate."14 0 While parental educa-
tion is undoubtedly a positive thing, the effectiveness of these pro-
grams hinges on many variables, including the degree of existing
conflict, the timing of attendance, the content of the course, and the
teaching strategies of the instructor.141 Additionally, the more spe-
cialized parenting programs (which have proven most successful) are
see also Jeffries, Dr. Phil, supra note 81 (explaining that the goal of the alienator parent is to
keep the alienated parent and the child apart).
134. Richard A. Warshak, Family Bridges: Using Insights from Social Science to Reconnect
Parents and Alienated Children, 48 FAM. CT. REv. 48, 50 (2010).
135. Dobrish, supra note 127, at 10.
136. One study of self-reported alienated parents revealed that the psychological services re-
ceived did not help the situation, while another noted that individual and family interventions in
parental alienation cases have been "dismal failure[s]." Vassiliou & Cartwright, supra note 15, at
188. Dr. Richard Gardner posited that therapy for the alienator parent never works because
those parents do not appreciate their own psychiatric problems that cause them to emotionally
abuse their child. See Gardner, supra note 130. Some commentators believe that therapy could
work only if paired with "a temporary interruption of contact between the child and the alienat-
ing parent or a more permanent custody reversal." Fidler & Bala, supra note 2, at 10.
137. Warshak,supra note 134, at 50 ("[T]herapy may even make matters worse; the alienated
child and preferred parent feel the need to dig in their heels and prove their point, thereby
further entrenching their distorted views . . . . The reality is that we have many more treatment
failures than successes when it comes to our intervention with some moderate and all severe
cases.").
138. First appearing in the late 1970s, these programs now exist in almost every state. Linda
D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Inter-
ests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 408 (2008). A few jurisdictions even consider a
parent's satisfactory completion of a parent education course when determining whether to
grant visitation rights to that parent. Id. When initially created, parenting courses served to
familiarize parents with the emotions surrounding divorce and to educate them about the danger
of putting their child in the middle of their own discord. Id. at 408-09.
139. Id. at 408; Maldonado, supra note 11, at 475; McGlynn, supra note 8, at 541. The goal of
these programs "is to improve parental attitudes and behavior through awareness and knowl-
edge." McGlynn, supra note 8, at 541. Over time, these programs have become more special-
ized. Elrod & Dale, supra note 138, at 409.
140. Elrod & Dale, supra note 138, at 409.
141. Id.
134
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not universally available, 142 and even where they are, heavy case loads
lead to shorter classes, 143 which dilutes their effectiveness.
Over the last forty years, alternative dispute resolution (typically
mediation) has become a popular tool for resolving family law is-
sues144 arising before, during, or after divorce proceedings,145 includ-
ing those involving parental alienation. Although mediation is
generally perceived as achieving positive outcomes, 146 it cannot al-
ways remedy parental alienation. Unless publicly funded, mediation
is expensive and, therefore, is not an option for all alienated par-
ents. 14 7 Additionally, as mediation has increased in popularity, heavy
case loads, inadequate staffing, and increasingly complex cases make
it difficult for families to receive the time necessary for satisfactory
results.148 Parental alienation cases bring additional problems to the
mediation process. At least some opine that "referrals to mediation
... are often futile because implicit in these processes is a lack of a
swift directive that is often perceived by the alienator [parent] as de-
noting approval of his or her behavior."14 9 Additionally, mediation is
142. See Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the
End for Mandatory Medicine?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 373 (2009) (explaining that such programs
were offered by less than half of responding agencies). The more general programs have not
been shown to improve parental relationships or substantially reduce litigation. Elrod & Dale,
supra note 138, at 409.
143. Generally these shorter classes last only two to four hours. Maldonado, supra note 11, at
475.
144. Salem, supra note 142, at 373; see also Vestal, supra note 8, at 488. Some jurisdictions
require the parties to any custody dispute (including those involving allegations of parental
alienation) to participate in mediation. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.500 (West 2000);
N.C. GEN. STrAT. ANN. § 50-13.1 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.765(1) (West 2003). In
others, participation is voluntary. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-602
(2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West 2006).
145. McGlynn, supra note 8, at 541.
146. E.g., Salem, supra note 142, at 373-74 (explaining that mediation, as compared to the
adversarial processes, results in faster settlement, greater levels of party satisfaction, and im-
proved post-separation family relationships). "[M]ediation can reduce the initial level of con-
flict, which can in turn reduce the long term level of conflict." Carter v. Carter, 470 S.E.2d 193.
201 (W. Va. 1996); see also Maldonado, supra note 11, at 469 (discussing the benefits of media-
tion). Note, however, that some professionals argue that mediation is, at best, ineffective in
severe alienation cases. Vestal, supra note 8, at 501 ("[M]ediating [parental alienation] cases
may provide a platform for the accusing parent to continue to espouse his/her hurtful views
which causes more pain to the other parent. [Slince one parent is framing the other parent as a
villain, it is most unlikely that any agreement can be reached." (quoting Ramona Buck. director
of mediation services for the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Maryland)). At worst, some believe it to
"be inappropriate, and even dangerous." Elrod & Dale, supra note 138, at 408.
147. See Salem, supra note 142, at 382; Vestal, supra note 8, at 499.
148. Maldonado, supra note 11, at 473-74; Salem, supra note 142, at 377.
149. Walsh & Bone, supra note 3, at 95; see also Lauren R. v. Ted R., No. 203699-02, 2010 WL
2089283, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 2010) ("Protraction or delay in parental alienation cases
often serve to reinforce the offending conduct and potentially undermine any remediation that a
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not effective in situations where the parties' bargaining power is une-
qual 50 or where one of the parties is unreasonable or uncooperative
so as to sabotage the mediation effort.15' These situations are typical
in parental alienation cases, making mediation an unrealistic remedy.
Certain jurisdictions have begun to utilize parent coordinators in
some hostile custody cases in which the parties engage in prolific mo-
tion practice or destructive behaviors152 (including those involving pa-
rental alienation).' 53 Although parenting coordination is certainly a
step in the right direction, it too is expensive, 154 and in most jurisdic-
tions, the parenting coordinator is allowed to make only minor deci-
sions that may not be binding in some cases.'55 Finally, some question
the propriety of judicial delegation of authority to a neutral third
party.156
Parental alienation victims may also pursue family law remedies de-
signed to punish the alienator parent. These include contempt or-
ders,'57 sanctions, 58 costs, attorney fees, and the suspension of child
court could fashion with appropriate therapy, parent coordination, and/or, a change in cus-
tody."). The delays and continuances associated with judicial proceedings may also have the
same result. See Vassiliou & Cartwright, supra note 15, at 183.
150. Elrod & Dale, supra note 138, at 408; Maldonado, supra note 11, at 470.
151. See Vestal, supra note 8, at 496.
152. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Grigsby, 39 So. 3d 453, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); L.S. v. B.S.,
No. 2009-CA-002288-ME, 2010 WL 4366367, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2010).
153. The parent coordinator is trained to protect the child, manage recurring disputes, and
assist the parties in creating parenting plans and in complying with judicial orders. Elrod &
Dale, supra note 138, at 409-10. They also assist with the "day-to-day monitoring of the parents'
activities" in high-conflict cases. Id. at 409.
154. Salem, supra note 142, at 373; Maldonado, supra note 11, at 477.
155. In these cases, the parenting coordinator's decision is not binding "unless the attorneys
file a detailed stipulation with the court or the court approves the decision after a judicial re-
view." Elrod & Dale, supra note 138, at 410.
156. Id. One commentator has noted that such delegations are only proper in cases in which
parents have consented, but not all parents are willing to do so. Maldonado, supra note 11, at
477.
157. Referred to as "the most common remedy used to enforce violations of [rights]," an
order of contempt compels a parent interfering with the other's visitation to comply with the
court-ordered visitation schedule. See Geismann, supra note 18, at 596 n.202.
158. Sanctions may accompany an order of contempt and punish the violator parent in a vari-
ety of ways, including, for example, by ordering (1) extra visitation to the alienated parent (also
referred to as "make-up time"), see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728(b)(1) (1974 & repl. vol.
2009); (2) a temporary transfer of custody or primary residence or both to the alienated parent,
see, e.g., id. § 728(b)(2); (3) the alienator parent to pay a fine, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 552.644(2)(d) (West 2005); and (4) the alienator parent to post a bond to secure compliance
with court orders, see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:342 (2008). Some jurisdictions have even
criminalized intentional interference with visitation. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.125 (2010);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-501 (1987 & repl. vol. 2006); Morrr. CODE ANN. § 45-5-631 (2011).
136
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support obligations.159 While each remedy standing alone has its own
share of problems, 160 the more universal limitation to all of them is
that they are usually available only in situations where the alienator
parent has actually denied the alienated parent physical contact with
the child.161 Furthermore, awarding such remedies can sometimes be
counterproductive because a child, having already rejected an alien-
ated parent, will only further reject him if he causes trouble for the
alienator parent with whom the child is aligned. 162
In addition to the drawbacks of individual family law remedies, crit-
ics of the family law approach to parental alienation universally assert
that the "system is broken." 163 However, consensus is lacking in their
159. See, e.g., Lew v. Sobel, 849 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (App. Div. 2007) (deciding that, because
the mother deliberately interfered with the father's visitation rights, fifty percent of the father's
child support obligation would be held in escrow until the mother was able to "certif[y], to the
satisfaction of the New York Supreme Court, her compliance with the visitation provisions of the
[court's] order" and her lack of interference with the father's visitation rights).
160. Contempt orders are "time consuming and costly." Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at
276-77. Any associated relief can be difficult to enforce and fails to compensate the alienated
parent for time lost or emotional distress, therefore "rarely deter[ring] future parental interfer-
ence." Id. at 277.
Relief for civil sanctions are frequently denied because of the lack of specificity regarding
visitation in the judgment or court order, making it difficult for the court to find a wrongdoing by
one of the parents. Even when the court makes such a finding, the effectiveness of sanctions is
questionable, given that fines may be so nominal as to fail "to cause any change in active access,
let alone changing subversive or subconscious behavior." Id. at 276.
Suspension of child support obligations is not an adequate remedy for alienated parents. The
Uniform Reciprocal Child Support Act, and many jurisdictions specifically disallow it. See, e.g.,
Moffat v. Moffat, 612 P.2d 967, 970 (Cal. 1980) (finding that the obligation to pay child support is
unaffected by the custodial parent's interference with visitation); In re Marriage of Harper, 764
P.2d 1283, 1286 (Mont. 1988) ("The determination or enforcement of a duty of support owed to
one obligee is unaffected by any interference by another obligee with rights of custody or visita-
tion granted by the court." (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-124 (2011)); Hendrickson v. Hen-
drickson, 590 N.W.2d 220, 223 (N.D. 1999) (finding that the trial court erred in ordering child
support payments to be placed in a separate account to be used for the children's secondary
education). Suspending child support obligations creates a circular problem in that the noncus-
todial parent is withholding child support because of the interference with his visitation rights,
whereas the custodial parent is interfering with visitation because of the withholding of child
support.
Ultimately, it is repugnant to the child's interest, and the child is the loser when this remedy is
granted. Carter v. Carter, 470 S.E.2d 193, 203 n.20 (W. Va. 1996). But see Welsh v. Lawler (In re
Welsh), 534 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (App. Div. 1988) (affirming the family court's decision to suspend
child support obligations until the noncustodial parent was allowed overnight visitation with
children).
161. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Major, No. 91,658, 2004 WL 2085794, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App.
Sept. 17, 2004) (ordering the mother to pay the father's attorney fees, explaining that the father
"was forced to incur a substantial amount of attorney fees in order to defend his parental rights
in light of [the mother's] attempts to alienate the children from [the father]").
162. Brownstone, supra note 82 (explaining that alienated parents pursuing this route may
win the battle but lose the war).
163. NBC Today Show, supra note 76.
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beliefs regarding the cause of this inadequacy. Some alienated par-
ents think that the court system is uneducated or is not ready to deal
with parental alienation. 164 In essence, they believe that the judiciary
does not truly understand and appreciate the devaluation that alien-
ated parents suffer at the hands of the alienator parent, which in turn
causes them to feel anger and pain toward the courts.165 Further, they
believe the courts' inattention to parental alienation allows the aliena-
tor parent to continue alienating the children. 166 Some also express
frustration that all custody cases move too slowly through the court
system, regardless of the courts' knowledge of, and preparation for,
parental alienation. 167
Alienated parents, and even some not personally victimized by pa-
rental alienation, also question whether family law packs the punch
needed to fight parental alienation. The critics maintain "that a force-
ful judgement [sic] is required to counter the force of alienation,"168
but some believe that family law does not seriously punish alienator
parents. This could be due to the belief that some of the judges apply-
ing family law exhibit a sort of laissez faire attitude toward parental
alienation. As one attorney noted, "Judges are inevitably conserva-
tive in their orders. . . . Judges have been slow to place serious sanc-
tions on the alienating parent. If there is no threat of severe fines, jail
time or sole custody to the targeted parent, the chances are remote
that the out-of-control parent can be stopped." 169 Another commen-
tator went further, stating, "[W]hen a judge refuses to impose conse-
quences on an alienating parent for ignoring court orders designed to
maintain, and in some cases, restore, the other parent's normal, loving
relationship with his . . . child, the judge effectively tells the alienating
parent that the bad behavior is okay."170
Additionally, even when family law remedies do help the alienated
parent obtain physical access to the child, they do nothing to prevent
164. Danielle Holewa, Editorial, Learn to Recognize Signs of Parental Alienation Syndrome,
KALAMAZoo GAZETrE, Apr. 25, 2007, at A13.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Vassitiou & Cartwright, supra note 15, at 183-84.
169. Major, supra note 48; see also Four Myths of Parental Alienation, Richmond County B.
Ass'n (2005) ("Many judges don't punish the alienating parent for disobeying court orders aimed
at repairing the other parent's relationship with the child... . There are no teeth in most court
orders." (quoting Bonnie Amendola, a family law lawyer)); Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 122-23
(imploring judges to act decisively when it comes to alienator parents).
170. Mike Jeffries, Parental Alienation Lands in Jail, BASIL & SPICE (June 9, 2010), http://
www.basilandspice.com/love-and-relationships/62010/parental-alienation-lands-in-jail.html
[hereinafter Jeffries, Jail].
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the alienator parent from subsequent alienating conduct. 1 7  Finally,
while family law may seek to repair familial relationships in the con-
text of parental alienation, the greater problem with employing family
law to redress parental alienation is that it lacks an adequate vehicle
with which to remedy the emotional distress suffered by alienated par-
ents, leaving them without full compensation for the loss caused by
the disruption or the destruction to their relationship with their
child.1 7 2 In fact, it is antithetical to the objectives of family law to
impose emotional distress damages on a blameworthy alienator
parent.
2. Upgraded Relief Tort Law's Role in Remedying Parental
Alienation
Family law does not redress all of an alienated parent's injuries in
all cases,' 73 and it does not adequately deter alienating conduct, thus
leaving tort law an important role to play in parental alienation cases.
In recent times, creative alienated parents have realized this and,
more and more, have begun alleging parental alienation within the
rubric of tort law. Faced with this relatively new phenomenon,'17 4 Civil
courts have attempted to force parental alienation cases into the scope
of existing tort causes of action.
None of the existing causes of action are adequate vehicles with
which to address parental alienation. Under very narrow circum-
stances, courts have turned to prima facie tort,'175 interference with
custody, 1 7 6 and interference with visitation.17 7  However, none of
171. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 276.
172. See Berger, supra note 86, at 526.
173. See Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 276.
174. See Rohan Mascarenhas, N.J. Appeals Court Allows Lawsuits in Extreme Cases of Al-
leged Parental Alienation, NJ.com (May 3, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/
2010/05/nj appealscourt allows lawsui.html.
175. See, e.g., R.J. v. S.L.J., 810 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts explains a claim for prima facie tort: "One who intentionally causes injury to
another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and
not justifiable under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed although the actor's con-
duct does not come within a traditional category of tort liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 870 (1979). The prima facie tort is not intended to duplicate other tort causes of action,
nor is it a catch-all remedy for claims that cannot satisfy the elements of other recognized torts.
86 C.J.S. Torts § 8 (2006).
176. The cause of action is based on "society's interest in discouraging the disregard of cus-
tody decrees." Don C. Smith Jr., Causes of Action Against Noncustodial Parent for Interference
with Custody Rights to Child, in 5 CAUSES OF AcnIoN 799, 805 (1984). The Restatement (Second)
of Torts details the elements for interference with custody (also called "intentional interference
with parental rights" in some jurisdictions): "One who, with knowledge that the parent does not
consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled
to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the
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these claims are effective for parental alienation cases. Very few juris-
dictions recognize prima facie tort,178 and, even in some of those juris-
dictions that do, the elements of prima facie tort are directly contrary
to the allegations of parental alienation, such that pleading parental
alienation effectively pleads a plaintiff out of a claim for prima facie
tort.179 Similarly, interference with custody and interference with visi-
tation are not suitable claims under which to allege parental aliena-
tion. Despite the argument that a custodial parent may suffer harm
without actual loss of custody, 1s0 success on either of these claims re-
quires a plaintiff-parent to prove that the defendant-parent either ab-
ducted the child or induced the child to either leave or not return.181
parent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977). Today, most jurisdictions will allow a
custodial parent to assert a claim for interference with custody only in very narrow
circumstances.
177. Public policy in most states favors allowing a child access to both parents. ELROD, supra
note 35, § 6:26. Some courts have gone so far as to recognize that visitation is a right of the child.
See, e.g., Dschaak v. Dschaak, 479 N.W.2d 484, 487 (N.D. 1992) ("Ordinarily, visitation between
a child and noncustodial parent is viewed as being in the best interests of the child and not
merely a privilege of the noncustodial parent but a right of the child."). But see In re Marriage of
Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 620 (Colo. App. 1997) (noting that visitation "is primarily a right of the
child and only secondarily a right of the parent"). Yet, a 1994 study of the Children's Rights
Council revealed that interference with visitation had affected approximately six million children
in the United States. Vassiliou & Cartwright, supra note 15, at 183. Injury to parental rights may
be less severe in visitation cases, as compared to custody cases, but courts recognizing interfer-
ence with visitation as a cause of action also recognize that this "is a matter of degree that
logically relates to damages rather than liability." Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706, 711
(W.D. Mo. 1984).
178. Research reveals that prima facie tort is recognized in California, Missouri, New Mexico,
and New York. See, e.g., Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2010);
Ruby v. Sandia Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1267-68 (D.N.M. 2010); Carlson v. Geneva City Sch.
Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 355, 370-73 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
179. See, e.g., Meikle v. Van Biber, 745 S.W.2d 714, 715-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Addition-
ally, in some jurisdictions, to have a claim for prima facie tort, a defendant must be solely moti-
vated by malevolence. See, e.g., Carlson, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 371-72 ("Under New York law, a
claim for prima facie tort has four elements: (1) intentional infliction of harm, (2) causing special
damages, (3) without excuse or justification, (4) by an act or series of acts that would otherwise
be lawful. The plaintiff must plead special damages, and that the defendant was solely motivated
by disinterested malevolence." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Empire
One Telecomms., Inc. v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 888 N.Y.S.2d 714, 731-32 (Sup. Ct. 2009) ("The
elements necessary to plead a claim of prima facie tort are: (1) the intentional infliction of harm,
(2) which results in special damages, (3) without any excuse or justification, (4) by an act or
series of acts which would otherwise be lawful. Moreover, in order to make out a claim sounding
in prima facie tort, the plaintiff must allege that disinterested malevolence was the sole mo-
tivator for the conduct of which [it] complain[s]." (alterations in original) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). In the parental alienation context, this could be a difficult
element to satisfy, given that many alienator parents truly believe that their alienating conduct is
done for the best interest of their child and not as an attack on the alienated parent.
180. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 142.
181. See, e.g., Bouchard v. Sundberg, 834 A.2d 744, 757-58 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); Lapides v.
Trabbic, 758 A.2d 1114, 1121 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 2000); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New Eng., Inc.,
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Obviously, not all parental alienation cases involve such extreme facts.
More typically, courts facing tort actions for parental alienation have
relied on alienation of affections or intentional infliction of emotional
distress as the appropriate cause of action. Yet, as discussed in detail
below, neither is designed specifically for parental alienation claims.
In essence, tort law in its current form forecloses a remedy for alien-
ated parents.
571 N.E.2d 340, 351 (Mass. 1991). In some jurisdictions, a claim for interference with visitation
further requires that the physical interference be over a long period of time or that the defen-
dant commit some other egregious act. Edward B. Borris, Torts Arising out of Interference with
Custody and Visitation, 7 DIVORCE LITIG. 192, 197 (1995); see also Ruffalo, 590 F. Supp. at 712
(recognizing the cause of action but also suggesting that state courts "restrict this type of claim to
situations that are not insubstantial in duration and effect" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hixon v. Buchberger, 507 A.2d 607, 612 (Md. 1986) (ruling that the defendant's "belligerent
words" were "a relatively minor interference" with visitation).
Other problems exist as well. As to interference with custody, some jurisdictions, including
Illinois, Minnesota, and Oklahoma, do not recognize the cause of action. See, e.g., Whitehorse v.
Critchfield, 494 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 46 (Minn.
1990); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 138-39 (Okla. 1992). Even in jurisdictions that do
recognize it, its effectiveness as a remedy is se'>erely limited because the cause of action is so
narrow for reasons beyond the requirement that a defendant-parent abduct the child or per-
suade him to leave or not return. For example, as many courts have recognized, only custodial
parents may take advantage of the cause of action. See, e.g., Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538,
544 (8th Cir. 1998); Stewart v. Walker, 5 So. 3d 746, 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Cosner v.
Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243, 1246, 1248 (Wyo. 1994); see also Bargamian, supra note 16, at 130. In
fact, some courts have ruled that a parent with joint custody cannot sue the other joint custodial
parent for interference with custody, even when the other joint custodial parent actually abducts
the child or induces him to leave. Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 278; see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 cmt. c (1977) ("When the parents are by law jointly entitled to
the custody and earnings of the child, no action can be brought against one of the parents who
abducts or induces the child to leave the other."); Smith, supra note 176, at 813. But see State v.
Vakilzaden, 742 A.2d 767, 770-71 (Conn. 1999) (providing that a parent enjoying joint custody
may be guilty of the crime of interference with custody). Others states allow recovery when the
defendant is a third party. See, e.g., Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1999). In sum,
"[t]he tort of custodial interference does not provide a complete remedy." Joseph R. Hillebrand,
Note, Parental Kidnapping and the Tort of Custodial Interference: Not in a Child's Best Interests,
25 IND. L. REV. 893, 906 (1992).
As to interference with visitation, only a handful of jurisdictions recognize it as a cause of
action in tort. See, e.g., Ruffalo, 590 F. Supp. 706. Although critics deride courts rejecting the
claim as potentially insensitive, outdated, or reluctant to entertain novel claims, id. at 711-12,
these courts base their refusal to recognize the tort, in many cases, upon their fear that doing so
would "encourage claims for petty infractions." Gleiss v. Newman, 415 N.W.2d 845, 846 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1987). One court even opined that "visitation rights of a parent are not sufficiently
significant to be protected." Cosner, 882 P.2d at 1247 (citing Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
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a. Alienation of Affections
Alienation of affections is a tort-based cause of action under which
a plaintiffl 82-traditionally a "jilted spouse"I 83-seeks to recover
damages from "a third party adult who 'steals' the affection of the
plaintiff's spouse."184 Thus, it has been dubbed one of the "heart
balm" causes of action.' 85 According to § 683 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts: "One who purposely'8 6 alienates'87 one spouse's' 88 af-
fections from the other spouse 89 is subject to liability for the harml 90
182. Alienation of affections originated as a cause of action at a time when women were
considered the property of their husbands. During this time any attempt by another to have
relations with one's wife was considered a property tort committed against the husband. Jamie
Heard, Comment, The National Trend of Abolishing Actions for the Alienation of a Spouse's
Affection and Mississippi's Refusal to Follow Suit, 28 Miss. C. L. REv. 313, 314 (2009). Although
originally the cause of action was granted only to men, it was later extended to women. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 683 cmt. d (1977); Heard, supra, at 315.
183. Some jurisdictions allow such claims outside of the martial context. For example, some
allow alienation of affections claims by spouses against third parties who cause alienation of
affections in a nonromantic way. See Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 132, 137-38 (Wash. 1966) (al-
lowing a husband to sue members of a religious sect for alienation of his wife's affections).
184. Bouchard, 834 A.2d at 752 n.13; see also William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Propo-
sal to Prevent Adultery and Save Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 985, 990 (2001) ("The name suggests that the recovery [for alienation of affections] is for
the defendant's destroying the affection of one spouse for the other. In reality, however, the
recovery was for loss of consortium, meaning rights to monopolistic sexual relations, society, and
companionship.").
185. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 184, at 992 & n.27. Other heart balm torts are breach of a
promise to marry, seduction, and criminal conversation. Id.
186. This means that the acts referred to in the context of the second element "must have
been done for the very purpose of accomplishing [the alienation]." Veeder v. Kennedy, 589
N.W.2d 610, 619 n.14 (S.D. 1999). "It is not enough that the actor as a reasonable person should
have known that the acts might diminish one spouse's affection for the other" or that he or she
realize that the alienation was "the probable or even certain result" of his alienating conduct.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 cmt. h (1977). Note, though, that defendant could still
be liable under other sections of the Restatement. See id. § 685. The defendant need not have
been "motivated by ill will toward the [plaintiff] or a desire to bring about a divorce or separa-
tion" to be found liable; a defendant need only have diminished or diverted the affections of
plaintiff's spouse. Id. § 683 cmt. j.
187. In order to prove this element, a plaintiff must show "active and affirmative conduct" by
the defendant. Id. § 683 cmt. g. "Inaction is not enough . . . ." Id. Stated aptly:
One does not become liable for alienation of affections, without any initiative or en-
couragement, merely by becoming the object of the affections that are transferred from
a spouse. It is only when there is such active participation, initiative or encouragement
on the part of the defendant that he or she has in fact played a substantial part in
inducing or causing one spouse's loss of the other spouse's affections, that liability
arises.
Id.
188. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, only a married person may assert this cause of
action, including one who is part of a valid common law marriage. Id. § 683 cmt. 1.
189. "Loss of affection must be evidenced by objective manifestations," such as "by refusal of
cohabitation, by separation or divorce or by any other conduct on the part of one spouse that
indicates a diminution of regard for the other spouse." Id. § 683 cmt. f. Failure to show loss of
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thus causedl91 to any of the other spouse's legally protected marital
interests." 192 A defendant can successfully defend a claim for aliena-
tion of affections by showing that he did not know or did not believe
that the plaintiff's spouse was married. 193
Alienation of affections is not an adequate tort remedy under which
to address parental alienation.194 It is not even an option in most ju-
risdictions because they have abrogated the cause of action,195 with
existing love and affection is fatal. Id. However, "[t]he fact that the spouses were living apart at
the time of the acts complained of, whether because of the fault of one of them or by mutual
consent, does not bar recovery, nor does the fact that the parties were living together unhap-
pily." Id.
Note, however, that even without a loss of affection, a plaintiff may, depending upon the facts
of her case, assert a cause of action under other sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
including, for example, § 684 or § 685, which detail causes of action for loss of services in the
home and loss of exclusive sexual relations by an act of adultery, respectively. See id. H§ 684,
685.
190. A plaintiff need only show that her legally protected marital interests, including the "af-
fections, society and companionship of the other spouse, sexual relations and the exclusive en-
joyment of them, services in the home and support" are harmed. Id. § 683 cmt. c; see also § 683
cmt. f (explaining that even if the spouses were living apart or together unhappily at the time of
the alienation, "[i]f any affection remained, its destruction or diminution may be the basis of an
action"). This element does not require a plaintiff to prove that she suffered any financial loss.
191. This element does not require a plaintiff to show that the defendant's conduct was the
sole cause; it only has to have been a "substantial factor." Id. § 683 cmt. k.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 (1977). Some jurisdictions do not follow the
exact elements set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but the elements they adopt are
similar. See, e.g., McCutchen v. McCutchen, 624 So. 2d 620, 623 (N.C. 2006) (stating that under
North Carolina law, a plaintiff asserting a claim for alienation of affections must prove that (1)
he and his spouse were happily married and that a genuine love and affection existed between
them; (2) the love and affection so existing was alienated and destroyed; and (3) the wrongful
and malicious acts of the defendant produced and brought about the loss and alienation of such
love and affection).
193. However, one could be liable for any loss of affections caused as a result of her "sexual
relations with a spouse under the conditions stated in § 685," regardless of knowledge or belief
of the marital status of the spouse. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 cmt. i (1977).
194. Borris, supra note 181, at 199 ("[C]ourts are most reluctant to award damages on a the-
ory of alienation of affections . . . .").
195. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-106 (1987 & repl. vol. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-572b (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1
(West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-701 (repl. vol. 2010); see also Hester v. Barnett, 723
S.W.2d 544, 555-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to recognize the claim of alienation of the
affections of a child in Missouri).
The predominant reason for the abrogation was the public perception that such a cause of
action was nothing more than a weapon for blackmail and extortion. See, e.g., Segal v. Lynch,
993 A.2d 1229, 1236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (stating that such claims were "devices for
extracting large sums of money without proper justification" as "a fruitful source of coercion,
extortion and blackmail" (quoting Magierowski v. Buckley, 121 A.2d 749, 756 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1956))); Heard, supra note 182, at 316.
Some states, like Louisiana, never recognized it in the first place. See, e.g., Moulin v. Montele-
one, 115 So. 447, 449 (La. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So.
2d 228 (La. 1989). But see Corbett, supra note 184, at 1005 n.81 ("The Louisiana Supreme Court
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many states also specifically stating that no claim exists in the
parent-child context.196 Only seven states continue to recognize any
form of alienation of affections,197 but even for these few jurisdictions,
parental alienation is a distinctive problem. After all, one of the most
legitimate objections to a traditional alienation of affections claim is
that two adults, the plaintiff's spouse and the defendant, are both to
blame for their own consenting conduct that caused the destruction of
the relationship between the plaintiff and her spouse. Therefore, the
defendant should not bear legal liability alone. This objection is not
valid in the context of parental alienation, as blame and causation can
be more reasonably assigned to the alienator parent. 198 In sum, alien-
ation of affections is an old tort theory that has been fading from con-
definitively rejected the theory of alienation of affections in 1927. However, a panel of the court
had appeared to recognize such a right of recovery in 1924." (citation omitted)).
196. See, e.g., Davis v. Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Bock v. Lind-
quist, 278 N.W.2d 326. 326-27 (Minn. 1979); Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 555-56: Bartanus v. Lis, 480
A.2d 1178, 1181 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Other courts have declined to rule on the issue. See, e.g.,
Mackintosh v. Carter, 451 N.W.2d 285, 288 (S.D. 1990) ("We need not reach the issue of whether
the tort of alienation of affection of a child is a valid cause of action in South Dakota .... .
However, some courts have ruled that the abrogation of alienation of affections actions ex-
tends only to marital or conjugal relationships and, therefore, does not bar claims for parental
alienation. For example, in Segal v. Lynch, the court ruled that because a New Jersey statute
repealed only alienation of affections claims in the martial context, it did not operate to bar the
plaintiffs claim for parental alienation. 993 A.2d at 1237-38. Other jurisdictions disagree, ruling
that the abolition of alienation of affections as a cause of action applies to all such claims, includ-
ing those for parental alienation, because parental alienation ultimately sounds in alienation of
affections. See, e.g., Hyman v. Moldovan, 305 S.E.2d 648, 648-49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing
to interpret a statute abolishing alienation of affection suits as abolishing only claims related to
spouses); McGrady v. Rosenbaum, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (dismissing the hus-
band's complaint against his former wife and her parent, which alleged that they conspired to
conceal the whereabouts and condition of his child, because it was essentially a claim for aliena-
tion of affections barred by statute). The Restatement (Second) of Torts follows this logic as well.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 699 (1977) ("One who, without more, alienates from its
parent the affections of a child, whether a minor or of full age, is not liable to the child's
parent.").
197. These seven states are Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Dakota, and Utah. See, e.g., Hunt v. Chang, 594 P.2d 118. 123 (Haw. 1979); Schroeder v. Winy-
ard, 873 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1025 (Miss. 2007);
Thompson v. Chapman, 600 P.2d 302, 304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Heller v. Somdahl, 696 S.E.2d
857, 860-61 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Hershey v. Hershey, 467 N.W.2d 484, 488 (S.D. 1991); Heiner
v. Simpson, 23 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Utah 2001).
198. Some, particularly those advocating for the recognition of PAS, might argue that the
child is a participant, pointing to the child's rejection of the alienated parent. While this is tech-
nically correct in some instances of parental alienation (but not all), it is important to note that
by the time the child rejects the parent, he has been strongly influenced by the alienator parent,
who is usually the domiciliary parent whom the child trusts implicitly. Fidler & Bala, supra note
2, at 11 ("[M]ost successful alienation is perpetrated by the parent with custody or primary care
of children . . . ."); Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Maryland De-
clare April 25th Parental Alienation Awareness Day, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 29,2008), http://www2.
prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/04-29-2008/
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temporary tort law for some time.199 Such a tort is an inadequate
weapon against a common and dangerous social problem like parental
alienation in its current form.
b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), also known in
some jurisdictions as "outrage," 200 is a relatively new cause of action
in the tort law arena.201 Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides a commonly accepted definition of IIED: "One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct 202 intentionally or recklessly20 3
causes severe emotional distress 204 to another is subject to liability for
0004802049&EDATE= ("Parental Alienation behaviors take advantage of the suggestibility and
dependency of children . . . .").
199. Corbett, supra note 184, at 989.
200. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052, 1054-55 (W.D. Ark. 1994); Spurrell
v. Bloch, 701 P.2d 529, 535 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
201. See Bargamian, supra note 16, at 128 ("Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a
relatively recent development in tort law. The tort was slow to develop due to concerns that
emotional distress could be easily feigned." (footnote omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. b (1965) ("[T]he law has been slow to afford independent protection to
the interest in freedom from emotional distress standing alone."). It was not until the 1940s that
IIED was "fully recognized as a separate and distinct basis of tort liability, without the presence
of the elements necessary to any other tort." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. b
(1965); see also Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 431-32 (Vt. 1978) (detailing the evolution of
IIED).
202. This element requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant's conduct was "so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). In other words, a "recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him
to exclaim, 'Outrageous!"' Id. Courts have ruled that acting with a tortious, or even criminal,
intent will not suffice, nor will acting with intent to inflict emotional distress. Id.; see also
Heavrin v. Boeing Capital Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that filing
false claims in a bankruptcy proceeding and offering false testimony were arguably bad acts, and
potentially criminal as well, but they did not rise to the level of going beyond all possible bounds
of decency, nor were they behaviors considered utterly intolerable in a civilized community).
Comment d goes on to explain that liability under § 46 "clearly does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.... There is no occasion
for the law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt. There must still be
freedom to express an unflattering opinion . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d
(1965).
203. This element requires that
the actor desire[ ] to inflict severe emotional distress, and also . . . know[] that such
distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct. It applies also
where he acts recklessly, as that term is defined in § 500, in deliberate disregard of a
high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. i (1965).
204. This element requires that the emotional distress be severe. Id. § 46 cmt. j. Although
"[clomplete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of tran-
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such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it,
for such bodily harm."2 0 5
For multiple reasons, IIED is also not an appropriate cause of ac-
tion under which to assert parental alienation. First, while it is very
difficult for any plaintiff to recover under IIED because of the strict
judicial interpretation of the "extreme and outrageous" element, 206
that difficulty is only exacerbated for alienated parents.207 In most of
the reported cases, courts seemed sympathetic to IIED claims for pa-
rental alienation only when the alienator parent actually abducted or
concealed the child from the alienated parent.208 When such facts are
not present, courts have almost universally disallowed recovery. For
example, in Hixon v. Buchberger, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
ruled that a third-party friend of the custodial parent was not liable to
a noncustodial parent for IIED when the friend made belligerent
statements to the noncustodial parent in front of the child, made it
physically difficult for the noncustodial parent to take the child with
him, and intended to replace the noncustodial parent as the child's
father figure.209 The court explained that the noncustodial parent
failed "to describe conduct which is 'so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
sient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people," severe emo-
tional distress "includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions." Id.
205. Id. § 46(1). The latest tentative draft of the corresponding section of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts provides a similar definition: "An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional disturbance to another is subject to liability
for that emotional disturbance and, if the emotional disturbance causes bodily harm, also for the
bodily harm." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 45 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
206. Borris, supra note 181, at 192-95.
207. See, e.g., Sharon McDonnell Dobbs, Recent Case, Larson v. Dunn, 460 N. W.2d 39 (Minn.
1990), 17 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 1159, 1170 (1991) (recognizing "the difficulty in establishing
the boundaries of outrageous conduct"); Kristyn J. Krohse, Note, No Longer Following the Rule
of Thumb-What to Do with Domestic Torts and Divorce Claims, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 923, 931
("Problems in defining what constitutes outrageous behavior plagues courts both in and out of
the marital context.").
208. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 20-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding a father
liable for IIED after he abducted his child from the custodial mother and took the child to
Yugoslavia); Pankratz v. Willis, 744 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) ("Courts that have
squarely faced the issue have concluded that the unilateral separation of a child from its parent
can be extreme and outrageous conduct within the meaning of § 46."); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844
P.2d 137 (Okla. 1992) (denying the maternal grandparents' motion to dismiss the custodial fa-
ther's IIED claim against them, in which the father alleged that they aided the mother in con-
cealing the child from their father after becoming aware of the father's court-ordered custodial
rights). But see Ervin v. Estopare, No. CV 08-122-M-DWM-JCL, 2009 WL 50169, at *4 (D.
Mont. Jan. 6, 2009) (ruling, on a motion to dismiss, that a parent stated a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress caused by other parent's alleged interference with visitation
rights).
209. Hixon v. Buchberger, 507 A.2d 607, 607-08 (Md. 1986).
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and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. '1"210
In fact, some courts have denied recovery for IIED even when the
facts of the case did involve an actual abduction. For example, in Lar-
son v. Dunn, less than twenty-four hours after the court awarded sole
custody to the father, the mother fled the state with the child.211 The
mother's parents, who provided the necessary financial assistance for
the escape, refused to tell the father where the mother and child were
located, forcing him to seek help from local law enforcement and the
FBI.2 12 The father did not see his child for seven years. Yet, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court dismissed his claim for IIED.2 1 3 This ruling
spurred one commentator to note, "IIED is virtually useless as a rem-
edy for victimized parents whose emotional distress, although severe
and genuine, provides insufficient tangible proof to withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss. Consequently, most victimized parents are left with-
out a tort cause of action to recover damages for emotional
distress." 214
While the "extreme and outrageous" element has proven difficult to
satisfy in past parental alienation cases, doing so is likely to become
even tougher in the future. The latest trend in IIED analysis is to
require that the conduct at issue be both outrageous and extreme.215
Further, comment c to § 45 of Tentative Draft No. 5 of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts (using marital infidelity as an example) explains
210. Id. at 609 (quoting Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977)): see also Davis v.
Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Gross, J., concurring specially) ("The
allegations of the complaint [that the mother, stepfather, and maternal grandparents engaged in
parental alienation but not physical interference] do not describe conduct so outrageous in char-
acter and extreme in degree as to go beyond all bounds of decency, the standard for intentional
infliction of emotional distress."). Note that in Segal v. Lynch, a New Jersey appellate court
suggested that, in addition to allowing recovery for IlED when one parent abducts the child, an
alienated parent may also recover when one parent falsely and intentionally accuses the other
parent of sexually abusing the child. Segal v. Lynch, 993 A.2d 1229, 1240 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2010).
211. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1990).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 47; see also Settle v. Settle, 858 F. Supp. 610, 615 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (explaining
that, even if the defendant's sole purpose in moving the children to Florida and requiring the
plaintiff to post a bond before enjoying his visitation rights had been to inflict emotional distress
upon the plaintiff, the conduct still would not rise to the level of outrageousness sufficient to
sustain a cause of action and that such behavior would be considered "mean-spirited" or "harm-
ful of one's rights or expectations"); Smith, supra note 176, at 817 ("[R]easonable persons may
differ on whether the removal of children from a custodial parent and the subsequent secreting
of them in locations around the country without the custodial parent's consent, constitutes outra-
geous conduct.").
214. Dobbs, supra note 207, at 1183.
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
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that some conduct that may qualify as outrageous is nonetheless so
common that it cannot be characterized as extreme. 216 Parental alien-
ation could be similarly classified. As early as fifteen years ago, one
commentator recognized, "Apparently, with- a few exceptions, be-
cause of the popularity of denials of custody and visitation, it is diffi-
cult to prove that such denials are outrageous in modern society." 217
Parental alienation has become even more prevalent in recent times
for numerous reasons.218 The occurrences are so prevalent that they
may be considered a common occurrence. 219 Further, it will probably
216. Id.
217. Borris, supra note 181, at 200. But see Mark Gruber & Natalie L. Moran, Parental Alien-
ation in New Jersey, PARENTAL ALIENATION AWARENESS ORG., http://www.parental-alienation-
awareness.com/article.asp?articleid=194 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) ("A parent who has had a
child alienated from them, by the acts of the other parent could easily make out a claim against
the alienating parent that would satisfy the 'outrageous' element necessary to establish a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrageous conduct. . . . [I]nterfering
with parenting time and purposely destroying the relationship between parent and child, is the
type of behavior that could be seen as so extreme, to go beyond all possible bounds of decency
and be regarding [sic] as atrocious, and intolerable in a civilized community.").
218. See Darnall, supra note 7, at 324; Dobrish, supra note 127, at 9; April J. Walker, The
Extreme Consequence of Parental Alienation Syndrome-The Richard Lohstroh Case of a Child
Driven to Kill His Father-Will Courts Move Toward Allowing Children to Use Parental Aliena-
tion Syndrome as a Defense to the Crime of Murder of Their Own Parent?, 27 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 153, 159 (2006).
The reasons for the rise in parental alienation are numerous. First of all, the number of di-
vorces and terminated relationships between unmarried parents is on the rise. Approximately
one in two marriages in the United States ends in divorce, affecting approximately one million
children each year. See, e.g., RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAw/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 485
(2002); Sandra Leigh King, Abandonment: How the Texas Legislature and Family Court System
Fail to Meet the Needs of Texas Children, 51 S. TEx. L. REV. 75, 78 (2009). Second, parental
roles have changed. Not only have fathers gained confidence in their parenting skills (which
makes them more willing to seek more custody and increased visitation time with their children,
as well as more passionate about doing so), see Darnall, supra note 7, at 324, but also more
women have begun to seek careers of their own, forfeiting the judicial preference for mothers in
custody decisions. See McGlynn, supra note 8, at 531. Third, courts observing this relatively new
change in traditional parental roles have discarded the tender years doctrine, which favored
women with the presumption that the mother of a child is the superior parent. Baker & Andre,
supra note 15, at 15; Major, supra note 48. Instead, in the last 40 years, most states have shifted
to the best interest of the child standard and a presumption that joint custody is the better
option, refusing to automatically assume that the mother is the preferred custodial parent. See,
e.g., Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 15; Darnall, supra note 7, at 325; McGlynn, supra note 8,
at 531. As a result, custody decisions are a closer call, leading to increased struggles between
parents to gain custody. Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 15. As one author opined: "The
struggle between two passionate parents is a byproduct of modern-day divorce, and it sets the
stage for alienation." Darnall, supra note 7, at 324; see also Rosalind Sedacca, Divorce 2010:
Parental Alienation-Hurting Your Kids?, BASIL & SPICE (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.basiland
spice.com/love-and-relationships/divorce-2010-parental-alienation-hurting-your-kids.htmI
("When you mix two egos with dramatically differing perspectives, you're bound to get an entan-
glement of emotions compounded by allegations, defensiveness and self-righteousness.").
219. Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 15 ("[T]he absolute numbers [of parental alienation]
are mounting."); Debra Cassens Moss, Teaching Kids to Hate, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1988, at 19, 19
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become even more commonplace as the number of divorces and cus-
tody battles continues to increase. 220 As one commentator noted, "As
long as the divorce rate remains high and divorce proceedings are con-
ducted in accordance with the traditional American advocacy system,
America will continue to battle over children and prevent parents
from exercising their parental rights." 221 Therefore, it is likely that
future alienated parents will find IIED even less accessible as a viable
tort claim than do alienated parents today.
In addition to the difficulties of the "extreme and outrageous" ele-
ment, there is a second problem with using IIED for parental aliena-
tion; namely, the categorical refusal by some courts to allow IIED
claims for parental alienation. They do so because they view such
claims as nothing more than disguised alienation of affections claims.
Although some commentators opine that "courts should not dismiss
the action on the premise that it is a derivative of other torts,"222
courts do not hesitate to do so. For example, in Bouchard v. Sund-
berg, a Connecticut appellate court disallowed recovery because "the
emotional distress complained of flowed from the alienation of the
children's affections." 223 As the court explained, when the legislature
abolished alienation of affections claims, it "expressed its intent to
'abolish common law actions seeking damages for a particular type of
conduct, regardless of the name that a plaintiff assigns to that con-
duct." 224 Similarly, in R.J. v. S.L.J., a Missouri appellate court noted
that "the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot
be maintained where the underlying claim for alienation of affection is
not actionable and the emotional distress is the alleged consequence
of the same acts which caused the children to separate from the
parent." 225
(referring to parental alienation as "a growing problem"). A twelve-year study of over 1,000
divorces, which was commissioned by the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association,
found that parental alienation occurs regularly sixty percent of the time and sporadically another
twenty percent of the time. Chaim Steinberger, Father? What Father? Parental Alienation and
Its Effect on Children (pt. 1), N.Y. ST. B.A. FAM. L. REV., Spring 2006, at 10, 10. That same
study revealed that eighty percent of divorcing parents engaged in alienation tactics in varying
degrees, with twenty percent of those doing so daily. Baker & Andre, supra note 15, at 15;
Vassiliou & Cartwright, supra note 15, at 183.
220. Darnall, supra note 7, at 324.
221. Borris, supra note 181, at 200.
222. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 142.
223. Bouchard v. Sundberg, 834 A.2d 744, 754 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
224. Id. at 756 (quoting McDermott v. Reynolds, 530 S.E.2d 902, 903 (Va. 2000)); see also
Poindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052, 1068 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (rejecting the plaintiff's
outrage claim as a disguised alienation of affections claim).
225. R.J. v. S.L.J., 810 S.w.2d 608, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
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A final problem with using IIED as a cause of action for parental
alienation is that, in many jurisdictions, IIED is unavailable to a non-
custodial parent. For example, in Cosner v. Ridinger, a noncustodial
father sued the child's mother and third parties for IIED, alleging that
they concealed the child and prevented his court-awarded visita-
tion.2 26 The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of the plaintiff's IIED claim, finding no allegations of
outrageous conduct by the defendants.227
III. A NEW TORT LAw APP FOR PARENTAL ALIENATION:
"INAPPROPRIATE PARENTAL INFLUENCE"
Current tort remedies "are sadly inadequate and virtually ineffec-
tive," 228 leaving many parental alienation victims without a remedy to
make them whole.2 2 9 It is time for state legislatures and judges to
design a new app for parental alienation, a unique tort better tailored
to the factual context in which parental alienation occurs: "inappropri-
ate parental influence" (IPI).
The new IPI claim utilizes the elements of alienation of affections
and IIED because both address the effects of a destroyed relation-
ship.230 It also contains some of its own, unique elements. As a result,
IPI includes elements that are more difficult to satisfy than those of an
alienation of affections claim, but less difficult to satisfy than those of
an IIED claim. By combining elements of alienation of affections
with unique elements, IPI would be a tort claim better suited to ad-
dress parental alienation.
Because IPI would be specifically tailored to parental alienation, it
would avoid the pitfalls associated with existing tort-based causes of
action. Recognizing IPI would distance parental alienation from
traditional alienation of affections claims. In the jurisdictions that
have abolished alienation of affection claims, it is likely that the aboli-
tion is complete and that the courts are unwilling to recognize a viable
vestige of that tort for parental alienation claims. Moreover, IPI will
have elements more closely aligned with the realities of parental alien-
226. Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243 (Wyo. 1994); see also Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16,
at 279 (noting that courts may find l1ED inapplicable as against public policy when asserted by a
noncustodial parent against a custodial parent).
227. Id.
228. Niggemyer, supra note 4, at 587.
229. See Kristin A. Wentzel, Note, In the Best Interests of the Child? Minnesota's Refusal to
Recognize the Tort of Intentional Interference with Custodial Rights: Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d
39 (Minn. 1990), 14 HAMLINE L. REv. 257, 276 (1990).
230. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 135 (noting that IIED "addresses the ramifications of im-
paired relations").
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ation. Adopting IPI will also avoid the problems associated with using
IIED as a vehicle for relief for parental alienation, namely, allowing
plaintiffs to avoid the "extreme and outrageous" element. This as-
suages the concern that parental alienation is a mere derivative of
alienation of affections and extends relief to all parents.
Some may question the propriety of creating a new tort-like IPI,
given that many jurisdictions lack precedent for allowing tort claims
for parental alienation. However, lack of precedent is no reason for
denying a remedy to an alienated parent. 231 After all, the law is not
designed to be static but instead should be changed, adapted, and sup-
plemented to keep pace with the needs of an ever-evolving society
and the contemporary conditions and relationships within it.232
Others may believe that creation of such a new tort is unlikely or
would be unpopular. 233 Nonetheless, recognizing such a tort would be
beneficial, 234 as it would provide more complete compensation for
victims, hold tortfeasors accountable for their actions, punish harm-
ful and socially unacceptable behavior, and better protect the
parent-child relationship.
A. Proposed IPI Claim
As proposed and discussed in detail below, IPI will include the fol-
lowing five elements: (1) a sufficiently substantial relationship existed
between the plaintiff-parent and the child prior to the alienating con-
duct; (2) the defendant-parent engaged in severe or pervasive alienat-
ing conduct; (3) damage to or destruction of the plaintiff-parent's
relationship with the child; (4) the damage to or destruction of the
relationship between the plaintiff-parent and the child was caused by
231. See Strode v. Gleason, 510 P.2d 250, 252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) ("The novelty of an
asserted right and the lack of precedent are not valid reasons for denying relief to one who has
been injured by the conduct of another.").
232. Id. ("The common law has been determined by the needs of society and must recognize
and be adaptable to contemporary conditions and relationships. '[S]tability should not be con-
fused with perpetuity. If the law is to have a current relevance, courts must have and exert the
capacity to change a rule of law when reason so requires."' (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting In re Stranger Creek, 466 P.2d 508, 511 (Wash. 1970))).
233. McGlynn, supra note 8, at 539-40 ("An unpopular suggestion in dealing with parental
alienation was to create a tort for parental alienation."); Niggemyer, supra note 4, at 576 ("[T]he
widespread acceptance of a specific cause of action for parental alienation seems unlikely to
occur in the near future . . . .").
234. See Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 278 ("Severe psychological or physical interfer-
ence in the parenting relationship demands extreme remedies."). Even officers of state chapters
of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers feel that when the alienator parent is "inten-
tionally alienating and go[ing] out of [his] way to turn the child against the other parent, maybe
[he is] responsible for damages." Appezzato, supra note 89.
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the defendant-parent's severe or pervasive alienating conduct; and (5)
the plaintiff-parent suffered severe emotional distress as a result.
The first proposed element to a claim for IPI is that a sufficiently
substantial relationship existed between the plaintiff-parent and the
child prior to the alienating conduct.235 This threshold element should
be carefully analyzed by the court,236 and any claim lacking such a
relationship should be dismissed. 237 However, given that a loving re-
lationship is the natural state in most parent-child relationships, a pre-
sumption should exist in favor of the plaintiff-parent, requiring the
defendant-parent to bear the burden of proving that such a relation-
ship did not in fact exist between the plaintiff-parent and the child.
Logically, given that IPI is designed to remedy the emotional dis-
tress suffered by a parent whose relationship with the child is nega-
tively impacted by the alienating conduct of the other parent, a parent
without a sufficiently substantial pre-alienation relationship with the
child does not suffer the requisite harm. Courts routinely assess the
nature of relationships in numerous tort claims; for example, those
for loss of consortium and wrongful death. In analyzing the prior
parent-child relationship in the IPI context, a court could consider
such factors as the amount of time the plaintiff-parent physically spent
with the child,238 the efforts of the plaintiff-parent to maintain contact
with the child when not physically with the child (for example, by let-
ter, telephone, text message, or email), 23 9 as well as the plaintiff-par-
ent's participation in, and attendance at, the child's extracurricular
events.2 4 0 This element will eliminate the IPI claims of parents who
have no committed, loving relationship with their child and who may
be simply looking to litigation as an opportunity for revenge or for a
financial windfall.
235. This element is similar to one of the elements of a claim for alienation of affections. See
supra notes 182-99 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of alienation of affections
claims). Yet IPI differs from alienation of affections because, among other distinctions, it will
not include an element requiring damage or destruction to certain interests associated with the
relationship at issue.
236. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 138.
237. See id. at 138-39 (explaining, in the IIED context, that "[o]nly the destruction of a rela-
tionship involving close emotional bonds can give rise to [the type of] severe emotional distress"
that will be required to succeed on a claim for parental alienation and that "[m]inimal contacts
between the child and parent will not support a claim").
238. For example, a claim by a parent who only sporadically sees his child should fail unless
worthy circumstances dictated the limited contact. Id. at 141 n.103.
239. Id. at 139.
240. This factor will be especially important when assessing parental alienation claims as-
serted by a custodial parent because it is assumed that the child spends a vast amount of time
with the custodial parent. Id. at 139.
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A plaintiff-parent should bear the burden of proving the second
proposed element of IPI: that the defendant-parent engaged in severe
or pervasive 241 alienating conduct. 242 Some parental alienation activi-
ties occur in almost every divorce, 243 and most high-conflict divorce
cases carry with them at least some brainwashing and programming of
children.244 In fact, one study revealed that parental alienation occurs
"sporadically . . . twenty percent of the time." 2 4 5 Obviously, not all
alienating conduct should be actionable, and the severe-or-pervasive
requirement will ensure that IPI claims based on minor, petty inci-
dents of alienation are excluded. Further, a parent accused of IPI
should be allowed to defend against such a claim if he can prove that
his interference with the relationship between the plaintiff-parent and
the child was justified.246
In assessing the severe-or-pervasive element, the court should ex-
amine the defendant-parent's role in influencing a child to reject the
plaintiff-parent. 247 The components assessing the severity or perva-
siveness of the conduct should be disjunctive, allowing a plaintiff who
successfully proves either severe or pervasive conduct by the alienator
parent to satisfy this element. A plaintiff-parent who could prove that
his child was alienated through an intense or extreme but brief inci-
dent-for example, kidnapping or secreting by the alienator parent-
could satisfy the "severe" prong of the second element of IPI. A
plaintiff-parent who could prove that his child was alienated through
multiple instances of more minor conduct-for example, a pattern of
consistent and persistent alienating conduct of a long duration by the
alienator parent-could satisfy the pervasive prong of the second ele-
241. Because "severe" and "pervasive" are elements of claims for sexual harassment under
Title VII and interpretive jurisprudence, courts could benefit from existing judicial interpreta-
tion of these elements in the employment discrimination context. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2006); see also, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
242. "Severe or pervasive" is a unique element of IPI that, in essence, replaces the intent
component of alienation of affections and the intent or recklessness component of IIED claims.
IPI will not require proof of intent or recklessness because it can be assumed that any parent
engaging in severe or pervasive conduct, such as that described herein, had the intent to harm
the other parent's relationship with the child or was acting in a reckless manner. In other words,
severe or pervasive conduct should be actionable regardless of the defendant's intent or reckless-
ness, provided the other elements of IPI are satisfied. By omitting an intent or recklessness
element, IPI will preclude a defendant who admits to harmful conduct from arguing that he had
no intent to harm the relationship between the child and the other parent.
243. ELROD, supra note 35, § 6:26.
244. Vestal, supra note 8, at 489.
245. Steinberger, supra note 219, at 10.
246. See Berger, supra note 86, at 530 ("If, for example, a spouse has abused a child, there is
obviously justification for attempting to sever an established parental relationship.").
247. William L. Hill, Note, Tort Recovery for Intentional Interference with Visitation Rights: A
Necessary Alternative, 32 U. LouISVILLE J. FAM. L. 657, 668 (1993-1994).
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ment of IPI. In other words, interference falling short of deprivation
of physical contact should satisfy this element.248
Although this element is similar to one of the elements of IIED
("extreme and outrageous") and alienation of affections ("interfer-
ence with a relationship"), "severe or pervasive" is a more suitable
element for a claim for parental alienation. A plaintiff alleging an
alienation of affections claim must satisfy the interference-with-a-
relationship element, which is too lenient a standard for parental
alienation claims.249 A plaintiff alleging a claim for IIED must satisfy
the extreme and outrageous element, which is a nearly insurmounta-
ble barrier for parental alienation plaintiffs. 250 "Severe or pervasive"
captures the intense harm to the child but is notably less stringent
than IIED. Also, the severe-or-pervasive element elevates the harm
recognized in its alienation of affections counterpart and will ensure
that IPI claims based on minor incidents of alienation are excluded.
Third, a plaintiff-parent must prove damage to or destruction of his
relationship with his child. However, a plaintiff-parent need not
prove that the child has completely rejected him as this element does
not require the complete destruction of the parent-child relation-
ship.251 An alienated parent may satisfy this element by proving dam-
age to his relationship with his child. After all, parental alienation is
harmful regardless of the success of the alienator parent's efforts, and
parents have a duty to promote and encourage the relationship be-
tween the child and the other parent.252 Dealing with alienating con-
duct before a child completely rejects the alienated parent may save
248. Recognizing the damage to a parent-child relationship by interference that falls short of
deprivation of physical contact is harmonious with the current status of modern tort law, given
that it recognizes recovery for emotional-distress harm even in the absence of accompanying
physical injury. As early as 1973, one court noted the damage to a parent caused by
the loss of the love and affection of a child who continues to reside with the parent he
or she has come to despise as a result of wrongful action of a third party. Not only
would the loss of companionship and mental distress be present, but the constant an-
tagonism of the alienated child would be an omnipresent reminder and aggravation of
the injury.
Strode v. Gleason, 510 P.2d 250, 253-54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (citing Schurk v. Christensen, 497
P.2d 937 (Wash. 1972); Smith v. Rodene, 418 P.2d 741 (Wash. 1966); Murphy v. City of Tacoma,
374 P.2d 976 (Wash. 1962)).
249. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
250. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
251. J. Michael Bone & Michael R. Walsh, Parental Alienation Syndrome: How to Detect It
and What to Do About It, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1999, at 44 (advocating for recognition of "attempted
PAS," a term they used to describe the behavior described herein as parental alienation).
252. Id. at 48.
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the parent-child relationship.253 In assessing this element, the court
should compare the current status of the relationship between the
plaintiff-parent and the child to the status of that relationship pre-
alienation (which will already have been established pursuant to the
first element). Only when the court determines that the comparison
yields a notable, negative change in the child's attitude toward the
plaintiff-parent will this element be satisfied.254
Fourth, an IPI plaintiff must also prove a causal link between the
defendant's severe or pervasive alienating conduct and the destruction
or damage of the plaintiff-parent's relationship with the child. 2 5 5
However, if a plaintiff-parent proves that the defendant-parent en-
gaged in severe or pervasive alienating conduct, then the plaintiff-
parent should be entitled to a presumption of causation. 256 Thus, the
burden of proof for this element would shift to the defendant-parent
to prove that the destruction or damage to the plaintiff-parent's rela-
tionship with the child was not caused by his inappropriate parental
influence.
Damage to or destruction of the relationship between the plaintiff-
parent and his child, standing alone, should not be enough to satisfy
causation. After all, the child could reject the plaintiff-parent based
on his own experiences with that parent,257 such as when that parent
recently remarried, changed his personal life in some way with which
the child disagrees, or became involved with something the child re-
gards as repugnant. 258 Alternatively, the child could reject the
plaintiff-parent for reasons not related to either the defendant-
parent's alienating conduct or the plaintiff-parent's lifestyle choices.
For example, the child may simply suffer separation anxiety from the
defendant-parent or just prefer the defendant-parent because of their
common interests.259 Thus, the court must also ascertain the reason
253. Id. ("[W]hen attempted PAS has been identified, successful or not, it must be dealt with
swiftly by the court. If it is not, it will contaminate and quietly control all other parenting issues
and then lead only to unhappiness, frustration, and, lastly, parental estrangement.").
254. Hill, supra note 247, at 668.
255. This element mirrors one of the elements of the claims for alienation of affections and
IIED. See supra notes 182-227 and accompanying text (discussing of elements of alienation of
affections and IIED).
256. In some IIED cases in which it is impossible to prove the defendant's role in creating the
injury, courts have shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he did not cause the
injury. Berger, supra note 86, at 528-29.
257. Waldron & Joanis, supra note 10, at 121.
258. See Bargamian, supra note 16, at 140.
259. Susan Taylor Martin, Parental Alienation: Sickness or Psych Job?, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May 23, 2010, at 1A.
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behind the child's attitude change,260 and only when the defendant-
parent's inappropriate parental influence is a substantial factor in the
child's attitude change should the plaintiff-parent have a cause of ac-
tion for IPI.261 This element will eliminate the vast majority of frivo-
lous parental alienation claims.
Finally, the plaintiff-parent should bear the burden of proving that
he suffered severe emotional distress. 262 The basic premise of a claim
for IPI, much like one for IED, "is that destruction of a close rela-
tionship results in severe emotional distress." 263 Because this element
is also an element of a claim for IED, the Restatement comments ad-
dressing emotional distress lend guidance. Comment j explains that
severe emotional distress "includes all highly unpleasant mental reac-
tions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment,
anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." 264 To be actiona-
ble, though, the emotional distress must be such "that no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it."265 Nevertheless, the emotional
distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and
generally speaking, no liability should be imposed when the plaintiff's
emotional injuries are exaggerated and unreasonable. 266 That said, an
exception should exist when the plaintiff's emotional distress is the
result of his "peculiar susceptibility to such distress" and the defen-
dant has knowledge of it,267 which could be the situation in some pa-
rental alienation cases.
While the plaintiff bears the burden of proving severe emotional
distress, "the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's
conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed." 268
Courts should consider both the intensity and the duration of the dis-
tress in determining its severity. 269 A plaintiff-parent with only a min-
imal relationship with his child (as assessed under the first element)
260. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 140.
261. Alienation of affections cases also require alienating conduct to be a substantial factor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 cmt. k (1977). This requirement will allow courts to
avoid difficulty when the child's attitude change toward the plaintiff-parent is based on a myriad
of factors, including alienating conduct.
262. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 133-41 (discussing the same requirement in the context of
an IED claim for parental alienation). This element mirrors one of the elements of IED. See
supra notes 200-27 and accompanying test (discussing the elements of an IED claim).
263. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 139.
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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will only suffer a minimal level of emotional distress and will, there-
fore, be unable to recover for IPI.270 Likewise, a plaintiff-parent who
initially enjoyed a close relationship with his child should not be al-
lowed to succeed on an IPI claim if he cannot prove severe emotional
distress. This element serves to distinguish a claim of IPI from one for
traditional alienation of affections. Whereas a traditional claim for
alienation of affections requires only the loss of the relationship and
does not require a showing of any emotional distress (much less se-
vere emotional distress), IPI would require a high degree of resulting
emotional disturbance.
Because IPI is a proposed tort claim, it logically follows that a plain-
tiff succeeding on such a claim should be allowed to recover any and
all proven damages that tort law allows. As with any tort claim, in the
event that a plaintiff-parent succeeds on an IPI claim, the amount
awarded to him should be based upon the damages (actual and non-
pecuniary) that he suffered because of the defendant-parent's wrong-
ful conduct. Because IPI is a hybrid of alienation of affections and
IIED claims, damages recoverable under either of those causes of ac-
tion should guide courts and juries in awarding damages. 271
B. Potential Objections to IPI
Providing parents with a tort-based cause of action for parental
alienation opens the door to several concerns. 272 While these con-
cerns are valid and deserve serious and careful consideration, preserv-
ing and protecting the parent-child relationship from inappropriate
parental interference outweighs them.
The same concern that confronts practically any new tort will prob-
ably be raised in response to IPI: that the floodgates of litigation will
270. See Bargamian, supra note 16, at 133-35 (explaining a similar correlation in IIED cases).
271. For example, much like an alienation of affections plaintiff, one recovering for IPI should
be allowed to recover compensation for loss of a child's services, care, comfort, and companion-
ship. Like an IIED plaintiff, he should also be allowed to recover compensation for his own
emotional distress. In the event that the defendant-parent abducted or concealed the child, the
plaintiff-parent should also be allowed to recover any expenses incurred in recovering the child,
including actual expenses and legal fees. See, e.g., Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1302 (N.H.
1983).
272. Segal v. Lynch, 993 A.2d 1229, 1240 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) ("Even a cursory
examination of this [parental alienation] question reveals the profound public policy implications
raised by either permitting or denying such a cause of action."); see also Berger, supra note 86, at
511 ("[A] real conflict exists between parents' legally protectable interests in their relationships
with their children and the possibility that allowing a tort claim may provide another vehicle for
exacerbating the psychological and financial damages of divorce.").
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be opened.273 But one purpose of the law is to remedy wrongs, even
in the face of a potential opening of litigious floodgates.274 Also, in all
actuality, IPI may actually deter parental alienation, 275 conserving ju-
dicial resources. 276 Most courts confronting a tort claim between ex-
spouses fail to consider this competing policy. 277 Ultimately, no one
will know whether it will open the floodgates of litigation or whether
it will actually serve a valuable deterrent function unless and until IPI
is accepted as a cause of action.
Concern may also arise that a disgruntled parent, motivated by an-
ger and vengeance, could gravely abuse the action by wielding the
claim as a weapon of spite.278 This, in turn, could lead to baseless or
petty lawsuits. 279 However, banning claims on this basis evidences an
unwarranted lack of trust in the judicial system; after all, courts and
273. Mascarenhas, supra note 174; Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 47 (Minn. 1990) (noting
the possibility that recognizing a tort for interference with parental rights could "result in a
proliferation of litigation").
274. Courts and commentators have acknowledged this. See, e.g., Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d
335. 340 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The implicit threat of an avalanche of cases, arising whenever one
parent makes an uncomplimentary remark about the other . . . [will not] seriously undermin[e]
society or its laws."); Wentzel, supra note 229, at 273 ("[I]t is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation."' (quoting W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 56 (5th ed. 1984)).
275. See Hill, supra note 247, at 673 ("[A] clear and concise statement of a party's rights under
the law actually limits litigation in the long run.").
276. Niggemyer, supra note 4, at 588-89 ("[D]eterrence of potential parental alienation di-
rectly translates to a savings of judicial time and energy.").
277. Borris, supra note 181, at 194 (discussing Whitehorse v. Critchfield, 494 N.E.2d 743 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986)). Of course, some courts have recognized that "there are specialists in family law
who view the potential of damage suits as a useful deterrent to lawless conduct." E.g., Khalifa v.
Shannon, 945 A.2d 1244, 1263 (Md. 2008) (quoting Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706,
712 (W.D. Mo. 1984). Others disagree. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Iowa
1983) ("A tort claim will obviously furnish little deterrent or likelihood of recovery in the case of
an impecunious defendant."); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 139 (Okla. 1992)
("[R]ecognition of a tort for custodial interference will not deter parental abduction of chil-
dren."); Borris, supra note 181, at 200 ("Civil remedies have, in fact, had little deterrent value.");
Mary Louise Taylor, Note, Tortious Interference with Custody: An Action to Supplement Iowa
Statutory Deterrents to Child Snatching, 68 IOWA L. REv. 495, 513 (1983) ("The major weakness
of the tort action for interference with custody is the possibility that it may not succeed in pres-
suring an abductor-parent to return a child."). The reason could be that a former spouse deter-
mined to hurt an ex-husband or ex-wife may not be deterred from such conduct by the threat of
a damage award or that an alienator parent views a potential damage award as a small price to
pay for alienating the child from the other parent. Berger, supra note 86, at 484; see also Davis v.
Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Gross, J., concurring specially) ("If the
prospect of contempt cannot deter conduct deleterious to the parties' child, then the abstract
possibility of a damages judgment in the distant future will be even less likely to modify
behavior.").
278. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46; Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326, 327-28 (Minn. 1979);
Zaharias, 844 P.2d at 140; Segal v. Lynch, 1229, 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
279. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 136 ("Recovery for actual damages may not be the motiva-
tion for bringing the action, so courts are concerned about frivolous claims.").
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juries must differentiate between valid and meritless claims. 280 In es-
sence, just because the action could be misused does not mean that it
should not exist.
Others may argue that recognizing IPI will inappropriately shift the
focus away from repairing the damaged or destroyed parent-child re-
lationship and onto compensating the alienated parent. 281 However,
lawmakers have supported the policy of a child's enjoying a relation-
ship with both parents and have evinced a desire to punish those who
interfere with it.282 The common law has followed suit,2 8 3 with tort
law traditionally protecting relational interests from interference. 28 4
Some fear that a tort such as IPI may "escalat[e] intrafamily war-
fare," 28 5 making unhappy relationships even worse.286 This argument
is unpersuasive because, given that the parents are already divorced or
separated and only one of them has legal custody of the child, there is
no remaining family, at least in the sense of a family unit.2 8 7 Thus,
litigation is unlikely to cause much additional harm.288 To the extent
that any "family" remains to be protected, it could be that prohibiting
an action for damages would in fact be what actually worsens the al-
ready unhappy relationship. After all, the alienated parent has suf-
fered damages at the hands of the alienator parent, and denying the
280. See Berger, supra note 86, at 522 ("Although some courts and commentators are con-
cerned about the filing of false claims for emotional distress, there is little evidence that plaintiffs
regularly malinger to file tort actions, and courts and juries have been able to discern false claims
for physical injury and to put dollar amounts on physical pain and suffering.").
281. Appezzato, supra note 89. One court has noted that a parent's "interest in compensation
should not outweigh the effects of bitter accusations on young children." Larson, 460 N.W.2d at
46.
282. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 135 ("Legislatures have endorsed the importance of a child
maintaining contact with both parents . . . . Legislatures support legal sanctions for interfering
with the parent-child relationship.").
283. Khalifa v. Shannon, 945 A.2d 1244, 1253 (Md. 2008) ("The common law has traditionally
recognized a parent's interest in freedom from tortious conduct harming his relationship with his
child . . . ." (quoting Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New Eng., Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 251 (Mass. 1991)).
284. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 48 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting) ("Tort law long has protected 'rela-
tional' interests, such as between family members, from interference.")
285. Id. at 46; see also Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326, 327-28 (Minn. 1979) (expressing
concern over potential intrafamily conflict); McKinney v. Cunniffe, No. 55631-2-1, 2005 WL
3150319, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2005) (same).
286. See Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46; Bock, 278 N.W.2d at 328.
287. Of course, the child may consider both parents her family, and both parents will normally
consider the child to be part of their family. It is the "family," as a unit, that is no longer
existent.
288. Wentzel, supra note 229, at 269; see also Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 48 (Popovich, C.J., dis-
senting) ("[F]amilial relationships [are] already wounded by divorce .... Depriving the victim-
ized parent of a forum for redress . . . will not necessarily promote the family's healing.");
Danielle Jsman, Gardner's Witch-Hunt, U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y, Fall 1996, at 12 (noting
that after divorce, the family falls apart and is not a stable unit).
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alienated parent a damage remedy will not undo the alienating con-
duct he has suffered.289 Instead, it will allow the alienator parent to
avoid liability,290 leaving the alienated victim to suffer financially and
emotionally. 291 Both results are unacceptable and could logically lead
to more anger and discontent on the alienated parent's part.292 Addi-
tionally, these results contradict basic tort propositions.293
Others are apprehensive of a tort like IPI because it might be con-
trary to the best interest of the child.2 94 However, a child victim of
parental alienation would have already been emotionally harmed by
the alienating conduct, and a judicial foreclosure of the alienated par-
ent's action will not undo that harm.295 Critics of tort claims for pa-
rental alienation fear that the child could be pushed into the role of
key witness and therefore be subjected to intense psychological evalu-
ations and legal questioning at depositions and trial.2 96 However, as
distasteful as this may seem, the reality is that children are already
289. See Dobbs, supra note 207, at 1178 ("Preventing an aggrieved parent from recovering
damages will not make the abduction any less acrimonious or painful for the child or for other
family members. In fact, leaving one parent to bear the financial and emotional burdens result-
ing from the abducting parent's wrongful conduct may exacerbate an already volatile
situation.").
290. See Bargamian, supra note 16, at 136.
291. Dobbs, supra note 207, at 1178.
292. See Niggemyer, supra note 4, at 587 ("Ignoring the tortious wrong to a parent whose
child's affections are intentionally alienated is unacceptable.").
293. See Bargamian, supra note 16, at 137 ("Disallowing the [tort] case allows the tortfeasor to
avoid liability, while leaving the victim to suffer. This contradicts the basic tort proposition of
social responsibility for one's acts." (footnote omitted)); Wentzel, supra note 229, at 268
("[M]aintaining family harmony [is] secondary to affording a remedy to a party injured by an-
other's conduct.").
294. Davis v. Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Gross, J., concurring
specially) ("Involvement of children in protracted litigation in pursuit of a money judgment can-
not be in their best interest."); Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 45 (Minn. 1990); Segal v. Lynch,
993 A.2d 1229, 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (expressing concern that tort suits for
parental alienation could be used by a "parent with little to no consideration of how the litiga-
tion will affect the child," potentially causing great harm to the child, and explaining that plain-
tiff's IIED suit is "inimical to and irreconcilable with the best interests of the children involved
in this suit"); Appezzato, supra note 89; Mascarenhas, supra note 174. But see Berger, supra
note 86, at 511 ("[I]t is difficult to discern how allowing one parent to escape liability for inter-
fering with the child's existing relationship with the other parent can support the best interests of
the children.").
295. See Bargamian, supra note 16, at 136.
296. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 45-46 (noting with regard to a similar tort that it "would create a
new burden on children who . . . . may be forced to testify against his or her own mother or
father," and commenting that allowing tort suits "would place innocent children in the middle of
a vigorous, probably vicious, lawsuit between their parents[ ]" and "would duplicate the ambiva-
lence and dislocation of the dissolution itself"); Segal, 993 A.2d at 1240-41.
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courtroom participants, both in family law and criminal matters.297 In
fact, it is likely that even absent a tort claim, the alienated parent will
petition the judiciary for a custody remedy, which will require the
child's participation. 298
A further concern is that allowing one parent to recover large dam-
age awards from the other parent could have a negative financial im-
pact on the child. Particularly, some may fear that the child will lose
his financial support from the liable parent if that parent must pay
damages to the other parent.299 However, it is possible that shifting
money between parents will not necessarily deprive the child of finan-
cial support. In most states, an income-shares model is used to deter-
mine child support obligations. This means that the amount necessary
to support a particular child is set by statute, and each parent is as-
sessed a certain percentage of that amount based on his ability to do
so.3 00 For example, a court may determine that the amount necessary
to support a particular child is $600. If the noncustodial parent earns
$200,000 per year and the custodial parent earns $100,000 per year,
the noncustodial parent, responsible for two-thirds of the $600, will
pay the custodial parent $400 in child support. In the event that the
noncustodial parent successfully asserts an IPI claim, obtaining a dam-
age award to be paid by the custodial parent, the figure needed to
support the child ($600) will not change. What will change is the frac-
tion of that $600 for which each parent bears responsibility. Either
way, the noncustodial parent who has been bettered financially by the
damage award in his favor will be responsible for a bigger fraction of
the $600. By contrast, the custodial parent whose financial position is
worse as a result of the damage award against her will be responsible
for a smaller fraction of the $600. Ultimately, $600 will be going to
the child for his support.
Opponents may argue that IPI will be a difficult claim for courts to
handle and point to the courts' potential struggle to fashion a remedy
for alienated parents. 301 While this may be true, "difficulty in fashion-
297. Dobbs, supra note 207, at 1178 ("[A] child's testimony or participation in a civil lawsuit
. . . is no more necessary than in a criminal prosecution [for kidnapping or in family law
matters].").
298. Bargamian, supra note 16, at 137 ("[A] parent suffering severe emotional distress from
the loss of a relationship would resort to legal proceedings to enforce or modify the custody
order in any event. An intentional infliction claim merely substitutes a damage action for a
custody action.").
299. See Berger, supra note 86, at 511 ("[J]udges should protect against the possibility that a
child's future support may be diminished by allowing a spouse to recover excessive damages
from the other spouse."); Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 16, at 280; Taylor, supra note 277, at 515.
300. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1 (2008).
301. Niggemyer, supra note 4, at 584.
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ing relief for injured parties must not deter the judicial system from
taking every step necessary to create a remedy that fits the problem-
a remedy that truly rights the wrong." 302 In the IPI context, tort law
will do what it ordinarily does: compensate a victim with money. This
gives rise to the concern that tort damages will be incalculable because
they are uncertain and speculative. 303 This problem is not unique to
IPI claims, as it is seen elsewhere, in the tort system, and other tort
claims are not barred on this basis.304 Further, because IPI is based on
alienation of affections and IIED, courts and juries may be guided by
prior decisions involving those torts in determining remedies for IPI
claims.
Of course, this raises an additional objection to IPI: money cannot
fix the problem of parental alienation. Yet, money cannot bring back
a victim of wrongful death or replace a tort victim's limb, and award-
ing damages for those injuries is not questioned. 305 Further, damages
have a place in parental alienation cases. After all, money can ensure
a victim's access to psychological care, and it also legitimizes her inju-
ries and reinforces society's expectations that a tortfeasor will be pun-
ished and not allowed to profit from her wrongs.306 In other words,
while money may not sufficiently remedy all harm, it is nonetheless
necessary.
Finally, others may be concerned with difficulties of proof associ-
ated with an IPI claim. 307 Again, this is not a new problem for tort
claims and has not been fatal to other tort claims. Also, because the
concern is largely based on the difficulty in establishing causation,308
and given the presumption of causation proposed above, this concern
is less problematic for IPI claims than it would be for other tort
claims.
While the concerns that may be raised in response to tort claims for
alienated parents are legitimate, none are so great as to preclude rec-
ognition of a new tort for parental alienation such as IPI. Even if
there were no other responses to them, these concerns should be
302. Id. at 587.
303. Berger, supra note 86, at 522.
304. See id. at 522 ("Difficult problems of establishing the amount of damages and deciding
the cause of injuries are encountered elsewhere in the tort system and are not seen as impedi-
ments when physical injury is involved. . . . Courts and juries have been able to . . . put dollar
amounts on physical pain and suffering.").
305. Id. Because IPI is based on alienation of affections and IED, courts and juries may be
guided by prior decisions involving those torts in determining awards for IPI claims.
306. Id.
307. See Appezzato, supra note 89 (referencing comments made by Dale Console, president-
elect of the New Jersey chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers).
308. Berger, supra note 86, at 528-29.
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trumped by the prevailing public policy of preserving and protecting
the bond between parent and child. As one court aptly noted, "The
high place accorded filiation stems . . . from a recognition that there is
a sanctity in the union of parent and child that . .. deserves the utmost
respect."309 Interference with that relationship is socially unaccept-
able and considered by some to be a danger to society,310 such that
absent exceptional circumstances, the best interest of everyone in-
volved-as well as society at large-demands the preservation and
protection of parent-child relationships. Ultimately, a parent suffer-
ing damage to his relationship with his child at the hands of an aliena-
tor parent endures the loss of his child, the destruction of his hopes,
insulted feelings, and an "irreparable loss of that comfort and soci-
ety";311 he should be allowed to recover for his injuries. Because pa-
rental alienation is such a threat to those relationships, recognizing a
new tort like IPI outweighs the concerns mentioned.
Further, given the stringency of the proposed elements of an IPI
claim, courts would be able to summarily dismiss frivolous IPI claims
early in the litigation,312 particularly those "brought solely as a means
of harassment or revenge."313 This in turn would conserve judicial
resources and save parents money. Courts should also freely award
costs and attorneys' fees in favor of those defending against baseless
suits and should impose sanctions upon litigants-and their attor-
neys-who file them. Such threats of punishment should reduce the
number of lawsuits filed. Furthermore, another tool, the counter-
claim, may deter baseless IPI suits. Because one asserting a petty
claim for parental alienation may be met with a claim against him for
defamation, invasion of privacy, IIED, or malicious prosecution, he
may think twice before instituting an IPI lawsuit. All of these factors
should preclude an opening of "the floodgates of litigation," whereby
309. Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299,1301-02 (N.H. 1983). That court went on to note, "[T]his
relationship is so intimately connected with the parent's person . . . ." Id. at 1301.
310. Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 340 (4th Cir. 1984) ("The harm or deliberate frustration of
a close or affectionate relationship between parent and child . . . were there no remedy available
to a parent who as a result was psychologically damaged strikes us as . . . potentially a danger to
society.").
311. Strode v. Gleason, 510 P.2d 250, 252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
312. Courts should not hesitate to employ the tried-and-true methods of weeding out frivo-
lous lawsuits and punishing the litigants who bring such suits. A court faced with an IPI claim
should carefully examine the pleadings, and, when a plaintiff has failed to plead allegations suffi-
cient to state a claim or who is unable to produce evidence sufficient to satisfy his burden of
proof, the court should grant motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. Berger,
supra note 86, at 525.
313. Dobbs, supra note 207, at 1188.
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greedy parents file baseless lawsuits, and should avoid exacerbating
familial discord and injecting the child into the forefront of litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Parental alienation is a serious problem that harms all parties in-
volved and society as a whole. Yet family law remedies simply cannot
compensate alienated parents for their resulting injuries, nor can they
effectively deter alienating conduct. Therefore, alienated parents
need the additional relief that only tort law can provide. While some
courts have allowed alienated parents to assert tort claims, existing
tort causes of action cannot adequately address and redress parental
alienation. Thus, a new tort should be fashioned from a combination
of the elements of alienation of affections and IIED, as well as from
elements uniquely targeted at parental alienation. Such a tort will
provide alienated parents who satisfy specific criteria with a tailored
cause of action that remedies their injuries and will provide potential
alienator parents with a financial incentive to refrain from alienating
conduct. Although allowing such relief raises compelling objections,
protecting the parent-child relationship from inappropriate parental
interference should trump them. Parental alienation is a problem as
old as the dissolution of the marriage, but, given its prevalence and
intensity in contemporary society, tort law needs a new app for that.
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